M. A. KOCHU DEVASSY ETC. versus STATE OF KERALA

Citation: [1979] 1 S.C.R. 797 · Decided: 15-09-1978 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: JASWANT SINGH · Disposal: Dismissed
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Judgment (excerpt)

., . 
) 
j 
·J 
••
M. A. KOCHU DEVASSY ETC. 
v. 
STATE OF KERALA 
September 15, 1978 
797 
[JASWANT SINGH, P. s. KAILASAM AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.J 
A 
Indian Penal Code-Sec. 21-Public Servant-Kerala Crin1inal Law An1e11d-
B 
ment Act, 1962-Secs. 2, 3-Prevention of Corruption Acl, 1947..:..Scc. 5-
Efject qf enlargement of definition of a public servant by Kerala anlendment. 
The appellants in the above appeal were tried and convicted in respect of 
the ,offences inter·alia under section 408, 465, 477 and 477A of the Indian 
Penal Code, 1860 read with s. :5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 
by a special judge. 
Both the appellants were members of a 
registered 
co--
operative society. The conviction of the appellants, was 
confirmed 
by the 
High Court. Sec. 21 of the Indian Penal Code defines a public servant 
"Members of the Executive 
Committee or 
servants of a 
cooperative 
society are not embraced by the categories mentioned in sec. 21" Chapter 9 
c 
of the Penal Code deals with offences by or relating to public servant. Sec. 2 
of ·the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 adopts definition of public servant 
from Sec. 21 of the Penal Code. By the 1952 amendment of the Crimirial 
Procedure 
Code the provisions of appoiritment of a Special Judge to try the 
offences have been provided. The said 1955 amendment adds certain more 
offences \vhich are to be tried by a special judge. The Kerala Criminal Law 
Ainendment Act. 1962 a-mended Sec. 161 of the Penal Code by adding an 
explanation thereto. It provides that for the purpose of the said section and 
certairl other sections a public servant shall denote, besides those who are 
public servants within the meaning of that section, 1nembers of the Board of 
Directors or the Executive or Managing Committee and other officer or servant 
of a Co-operative Society registered or deemed to be registered under the law 
relating 
to co-operative societies for the "time being in force. Sec. 3 of the 
Keralai Act provides that for the purpose of the Preventive of Corruption Act, 
1947, public servant shall have the meaning assigned to it under the explanation 
to sec. 161 of the Indian Penal Code as amended by the Kerala Criminal 
I.aw Amendment Act, 1962. 
( 1) The appellants contended that sec. 2 of the Kerala Act brought n1embers 
of the exet.'Utive committee or the servants of a registered co-operative society 
within the ambit of the expression "public servant" only for the purpose of 
Sections 161 to 165A of the Penad. Code and for no other purpose. Therefore, 
the use of the enlarged definition cannot be niade for the purpose of 1947 
Act. 
(2) If the intention of the legislature was to enlarge the definition for all 
purposes, whatever, it would have amended section 21 of the Indian Pen::i.l Code 
itself. 
Dismissing the appeals the Court, 
D 
E 
F 
G 
HEID: (1) The terms of sec. 2 of the 1947 Act as substituted by sec. 3 
H 
.of .the Kerala Act are absolutely clear and unambiguous and when they lay 
down that expression public servant shall have a particular meaning for . \he 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
798 
SUn.JlME COURT llEPORTS 
[1979] l 
~.c.ll. 
purpose of the Act, that meaning must be given to the expression wherever 
it occurs in the Act. "For the purpose of the Act .. surely means for tho purpose 
of all and not only some of the provisions of the Act. [803El 
(2) The Kerala Act carried out amendment of the 1947 Act insofar as 
the State of Kera!& was concerned. The 1947 Act deals not only with offences 
under sec. 161 to 165A of the Penal Code but also and mainly with those 
falling under various clauses of sub-section 1 to 5 of the 1947 Act. No reason· 
able line of distinction between the. offences under sec. 161 to 165A Of the 
Code on the one hand and those punishable under sec. 5 of the 1947 Act on 
the other appears feasible for the purpose of conferment of exclusive jurisdiction 
on special judges to try them. 
From this point of view also interpretation 
canvassed on behalf of the appellants is untenable. [804C-El 
(3) The arguments that the legislature would have incorporated the 34'1.i~ 
tional definition under sec. 21 if it desired to extend the scope for all purposes 
is without substance. If the definition had been enlarged by amendment of 
sec. 21 it would have made the new categories of persons brought by it within 
the ambit of the expression "public servant" liable to punishment not only 
for offences under sec. 161 to 165A of the Code but also for n
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