LexLT. COL. PRITHI PAL SINGH BEDI ETC. versus UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS
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• ··e- > • > 393 A LT. COL. PRtTHI PAL SINGB. BED! ETC. v . . UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS August 25, 1982 - [Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, CJ, D.A. DESAI AND A.N. SEN, JJ.] Army Act. 1950-Section 21-Scope f!f-Law prescribing procedure for trial of offences by court mart ial-lf should satisfy requiremen~s of Article 21 of Constitution--:Absence of provision for appeal-A ~acuna in the Act. Army Rules,· 1954~Rul~s i2 to 25, 37, 40, 44, 180 and 187-Scope of- Composilion of Court martial-Requirements of-"Corps" if nieans "Army Corps:'-Rules 22 to 24, if violative of Article 21 of the Constitution--Trial 'by Court martial-Prior enquiry by Court of enquiry if obligatory: ' ' ' . Principles. of natural justic~Rules prescribe compliance with principles of natural justice but make it dependent. upon requisition· by the person against whom enquiry is held-;-Procedure, if violates-article 21 of Constitution. Interpretation of statutes--/ntenlion of legislature how ascet:tained. The petitioner in each of 'the three writ petitiolls \\ihO was to be tried by general court ·~artial for.breach of army discipline questioned the legality atid validity of the order convening the general court ~artial, more particularly its composition. In their petitions .under Art. 32 of the Constitutioff it was 'contended on behalf of the petitioners that to satisfy the requirements of Article 33 the Jaw. must be a specific law enacted by Parliameni in which a specific provision impo- _sing restrictioti or eveh abrogation .. fof fundamental rights ~h<;!uld be made; (2) that rule 40 of the Rules should· be so construed as to subserve the mandate of Article 21 that the Army with its total commitment to national security against for~ign invasion. must be assured the prized liberty of individual members against unjust encroachment and the court should strike a just balance between military discipline a~d. individual personal liberty; aiid (3) that principles of natural justice should be obsefved even in resp.eel of persons tried by the Army Tribunals. · :Dismissing the petitionw, ..- HBl..D: The dominant purpose in construing a statute is to ascertain the intention Qf Parliament. One of the v.·cll recognised canoi:J.s of construction is that the legislature speaks its mind by use of correct expression and unless~ . there is any ambiguit>: in tht? language of the provision, the Courflshould adopt literal construction if if' does not le~d to an absurdity. To ascertain the literal B c D E F G , H / A B c D E F G H 394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1983] I s.c.11.. meaning it is equally necessary first to ascertain the juxtaposition in which the rule is placed. the Purpose for which it is enacted and the object which it is required to subserve and the authority by which the rule is framed. (404 F-H; 405 A-BJ Article 33 of the Constitution which confers power on Parliament to deter- mine to wha;t extent any of the rights conferr~d by Part III shall in their ,pplica~ tion to the members of armed forces be restricted or abrogated does not obligate. that Parliament must spec~fically adumbrate each fundamental right and specify in the law the degree of restriction or total abrogation of each right. That would be reading into Art. 33 a requirement which it does not enjoin. The power to legislate i_n respect of any iteffi must be referable to any entry in the relevant legislative list. ThC law has 'to be enacted by Parliament subject to the require- ment of Part III read with Art. 33 which itself forms part of Part III. Therefore if any provision of the ·Army Act is in conflict with fundamental rights it shall have to be read subject to Art. 33 as being enacted with a view to either restriCt- ing or abrogating the fundamental rights to the extent of inconsistency or repug- . nancy between Part III and the Army Act. (412 E-H] Ram Sarup v. Union of India & Another (1964] 5 SCR 931 : referred to.· Sectic~n 21 of the Army Act merely confers an additional power to modify dghts conferred by Art. 19(l)(a) and (c) by rules and such rules may set out the limits of 'restriction. But the specific provision does not derogate from the gene- rality of po_wer conferred by Art. 33. Therefore, it is not possible to accept the co-ntention that the law prescribing procedure for trial of offences by Court Martial DJust satisfy the requirement of Art. 21 . because to the extent the proce- dure is prescribed by law. and if it stand
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