LT. COL. KHAJOOR SINGH versus THE UNION OF INDIA & ANOTHER.
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828 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1961] r960 the question will now be answered in the negative. As already stated, there is no need to answer the second The Conirnissioner . h' h d t ยท . of Juconie-tax, question, W lC OeS IlO arl~e. Bambay The appeal is allowed with costs here and in the v. High Court. Jl.1 /s. Dwarkadas J(hetan .s- Co. Appeal allowed. _Hidayatullah } , Dece111ber I. LT. COL. KHAJOOR SINGH v. THE UNION OF JftDIA & ANOTHER. (B. P. SINHA, c. J., J. L. KAPUR, P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SUBBA RAO, K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA and J. c. SHAH, JJ.) Fundamental Right, Enforcement of-Power of High Court to issue writs against the Government of India-Constitution of India, Arts. 3z(2A). 226. The High Court of Jammu and Kashmir, relying on the decisions of this Court in Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao, [1953] S.C.R. rr44 and K. S. Rashid and Son v. The Income Tax Investigation Commission etc., [1954] S.C.R. 738, dismissed an applicatbn for a writ made by the appellant against the Union of India and Anr. under Art. 32(2A), the rele- vant provisions of which are in the matter of enforcement of fundamental rights the same as in Art. 226 of the Constitution, on the preliminary objection that the said application was not maintainable against the Union of India as it was outside the territorial jurisdiction of that Court. The appellant's case was that he was holding the substantive rank of Lieut. Col. in Jammu and Kashmir and had the right to continue in service until he attained the age of 53 on November 20, r96r, but was prematu- rely retired by a Jetter issued by the Government of India on July 31, 1954, without any allegation or charge and in contra- vention of Art. 16(r) of the Constitution. Held, that there can be 'no doubt as to the correctness of the decisions relied on by the High Court and the appeal must fail. 2 S.C.R. SUP!tEME COURT REPORTS 829 The jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution, properly construed, depends not on the residence or location of the person affected by the order but of the per- son or authority passing the order and the place where the order has effect cannot enter into the determination of such jurisdiction. Since ft:inctioning of a Government really means giving effect to its order, such functioning cannot determine the meaning of the words "any person or authority within these territories" occurring in the article .. A natural person, there- fore, is within those territories if he resides there permanently or temporarily, an authority other than the Government is within those territories if its office is located there and a Govern- ment if its seat from which, in fact, it functions is there. It is not correct to say that the word "authority" in Art. 220 cannot include a Government. That word has to be read along with the clause "including in appropriate cases any Government" immediately following it, which, properly constru- ed, means, that the word may include any Government in an appropriate case. That clause is not connected with the issu- ance of a writ or order and is not intended to confer discretion on the High Courts in the matter of issuing a writ or direction on any Government, and only means in such cases where the authority against whom the High Court has jurisdiction to issue the writ, happens to be a Government or its subordinates, the High Court may issue a writ against the Government. Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao, [1953] S.C.R. n44 and K. S. Rashid and Son v. The Income-tax Investigation Commission etc., [1954] S.C.R. 738, approved. Maqbulunnissa v. Union of India, I.L.R. (1953) 2 All. 289, overruled. The Lloyds Bank Limited v. The Lloyds Bank Indian Staff Association (Calcutta Branches), I.L.R. [1954] 2 Cal. I, referred to. Proceedings under Art. 226 are not suits covered by Art. 300 of the Constitution. Such proceedings provide for extra- ordinary remedies by a special procedure and there is no scope for introducing the concept of cause of action in it in the face of the express limitation imposed by it, that the person or authority concerned must be within the territories over which the High Court exercises jurisdiction. Ryots of Garabandho v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi, (1943) L.R. 70 I.A. 129, held inapplicable. The resulting inconvenience of such an interpretation of Art. 226 to persons residing far away from N
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