LOURDU MARI DAVID AND ORS. versus LOUIS CHINNAYA AROGIASWAMY AND ORS.

Citation: [1996] SUPP. 4 S.C.R. 540 · Decided: 09-08-1996 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K. RAMASWAMY, G.B. PATTANAIK · Disposal: Dismissed
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this case
Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
c 
LO URDU MARI DAVID AND ORS. 
v. 
LOUIS CHINNAYA AROGIASWAMY AND ORS. 
AUGUST 9, 1996 
[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.] 
Specific Relief Act, 1963: Sectioll 20. 
Suit for specific peifonnance-To grallt relief is ill the discretion of the 
Court-Party lliw seeks to avail of equitable jurisdiction of Court should 
come to the Cowt with clean hands-Discretion to grant relief should be 
· exercised by Court on sound principles of /aw-Petitioner filed a suit for 
specific peifonnance of sale agreement-Trial Court found that respolldelltS' 
I and 2 committed breach of agreemellt but denied relief oil the ground that 
respondent 3 was a bona fide purchaser without notice of agreemenf-High 
D Court affinned the finding of Tiial Court and found that petitioner had taken 
false pleas-Petitioner therefore denied relief as he did not approach the Court 
with clean hands-Held Couns below have rightly refused to exercise their 
discretion-No inteiference was called for with the order of High Court. 
E 
F 
G 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition (C) 
No. 14751 of 1996. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.6.96 of the Madras High 
Court in L.P.t\. No. 72 of 1991. 
V. Balachandran for the Petitioners. 
The following Order of the Court was delivered : 
This special leave petition arises from the judgment of the Division 
Bench of the High Court of Madras made on 12.6.1996 in LPA No. 72/91. 
The petitioner had filed O.S. No. 6n7 on September 10, 1980 before the 
Second Additional Sub-Judge at Pondicherry for specific performance of 
the Agreement of sale dated October 18, 1976 to convey the property in 
possession as tenants under the agreement. It is their case that a sum of 
Rs. 31,000 was sale consideration and a sum of Rs. 4,000 and odd was paid 
as part consideration. The balance consideration was Rs. 28,500. He was 
H always ready and willing to perform his part of the ~ontract but the 
540 
LOURDUMARIDAV!Dv. LC.AROGIASWAMY 
:,.11 
respondents were avoiding to executeJhe sale deed. Though the trial Court A 
found that respondents 1 and 2 committed breach of the agreement of sale 
but denied to them specific performance of the agreement on the ground 
that respondent No. 3 was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice 
of prior agreement with the petitioner. The petitioner filed the appeal in 
the High Court. Pending appeal, he died. Therefore, his legal repre-
sentatives have come on record. The learned Single Judge by judgment and 
decree dated September 11, 1980 agreed with those findings and held that 
B 
the 3rd respondent was a bona fide purchaser without notice of the 
agreement. In the impugned judgment, the Division Bench rejected the 
claim on the additional ground that the plaintiff did not come to the Court 
with clean hands. Therefore, he is disentitled to relief of the specific C 
performance. Under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, (for short, 
'the Act') the decree for specific performance is in the discretion of the 
Court but the discretion should not be refused arbitrarily. The discretion 
should be exercised on sound principles of law capable of correction by an 
appellate Court. 
It is settled law that the party who seeks to avail of the equitable 
jurisdiction of a Court and specific performance being equitable relief, 
must come to the Court with clean hands. In other words the party who 
makes false allegations does not come with clean hands and is not entitled 
D 
to the equitable relief. The Division Bench has pointed out in the judgment 
E 
three grounds which disentitle the plaintiff to the equitable relief as he 
came with a positive case of incorrect and false facts as set out in para-
graphs 4 to 6 thus: 
"On a perusal of the records we are entirely in agreement with the 
F 
view expressed by the learned Judge. It is quite clear that the 
plaintiff has not come to Court with clean hands. There are three 
circumstances which are pointed out by the learned Judge and we 
find that they are sufficient to warrant refusal of the claim for 
specific performance. First is that the plaintiff claimed that he was G 
already in possession of Door. No. 2/53 as a lessee and he was 
given possession of Door No. 1/53 on the date of the agreement 
itself, viz., 18.10.1976 by defendants 1 and 2. But, in the course of 
evidence he did not say anything about taking possession pursuant 
to the sale agreement. On the contrary, he deposed falsely that he 
did not mention in t
Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.