LILAVATI KIRTILAL MEHTA MEDICAL TRUST versus M/S UNIQUE SHANTI DEVELOPERS & ORS.
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A B C D E F G H 563 LILAVATI KIRTILAL MEHTA MEDICAL TRUST v. M/S UNIQUE SHANTI DEVELOPERS & ORS. (Civil Appeal No. 12322 of 2016) NOVEMBER 14, 2019 [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR AND AJAY RASTOGI, JJ.] Consumer Protection Act,1986– Explanation to s.2(1)(d) – ’Commercial Purpose’ under – When an activity/transaction is not for said purpose – Agreements to sell executed for 29 flats in 1995– Appellant-Trust took possession of said flats, constructed by respondent no.1, for providing hostel facilities to nurses employed by the Hospital run by the appellant – However, the structure became dilapidated and the appellant vacated the flats in 2002 – Complaint filed by the appellant before the National Commission– Initially, dismissed as barred by limitation– In review, the order was recalled, however the Commission again dismissed the complaint on the ground that the appellant was not ‘consumer’ u/s.2(1)(d) as the said section excludes a person who obtains goods and services for ‘commercial purpose’ – On appeal, held: Explanation clause to s.2(1)(d) was added by way of Ordinance No.24 of 1993 (subsequently replaced by Amendment Act No.50 of 1993) –Said Amendment Act also added ‘housing construction’ to the definition of ‘service’ u/s.2(o) – In the present case, the appellant validly took the possession of the flats constructed by respondent no.1 and paid consideration and can therefore be said to have availed of its housing construction services– Explanation to s.2(1)(d) is clarificatory in nature and only re-affirms the definition of ‘consumer’ as it already exists – Ultimately, whether or not a person is consumer or whether an activity is meant for commercial purpose will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case – It is not the identity of the person but the purpose for which the transaction is made which is relevant – Hence, private corporate bodies such as the appellant may engage the services of third parties for the purpose of providing perquisites to their employees – If in all such cases the third party service-provider disclaims liability on the ground that the hirer of the service is engaged in [2019] 14 S.C.R. 563 563 A B C D E F G H 564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 14 S.C.R. trade and commerce, it will open Pandora’s box wherein the employer as well as the employees will not have any remedy – Purchase of the good/service should have close and direct nexus with profit-generating activity – There is no direct nexus between the purchase of flats by the appellant trust and its profit generating activities – Further, applying the dominant purpose test, it cannot be said that the provision of such hostel facilities is integral to the appellant trust’s commercial activities– Purchase of flats by the appellant for providing hostel facilities to the nurses is not even remotely related to the object of earning profits or for any commercial use as envisaged u/s.2(1)(d) and hence, does not qualify as meant for ‘commercial purpose’ – Appellant is ‘consumer’ u/s.2(1)(d) for the present transaction under consideration– Impugned judgment set aside – Appeal restored before the National Commission, who is to decide the matter expeditiously. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1 The purchase of flats by the Appellant for the purpose of providing hostel facilities to the hospital nurses does not qualify as meant for a ‘commercial purpose’. Though the term ‘commercial purpose’ as referred to under Section 2(1)(d) has nowhere been defined under the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, Supreme Court has expounded upon it based on its lateral dictionary meaning in various decisions. It is true that the said decisions were rendered in the context of deciding whether the goods or services availed of in the facts of those cases were for a commercial purpose or exclusively for the purpose of self-employment. This does not mean, however, that in every case a negative test has to be adopted wherein any activity that does not fall within the ambit of ‘earning livelihood by means of self-employment’ would necessarily be for a commercial purpose. Respondent No.1’s argument is rejected in this regard. Explanation clause was added to Section 2(1)(d) by way of Ordinance No. 24 of 1993 (subsequently replaced by Amendment Act No. 50 of 1993). Amendment Act No. 50 of 1993 also added ‘housing construction’ to the definition of ‘service’ under Section 2(o) of the 1986 Act. In the present case, it is not denied that the Appellant
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