LexLAXMAN PURSHOTTAM PIMPUTKAR versus STATE OF BOMBAY AND OTHERS
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200 SuPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. 1962 LAX:l-.'1AN PURSHOTT A.M PIMPUTKAR /Jtctm6tr, 13. v. STATE OF BOMBAY AND OTHERS (S.J. IMAM, K. SuBBA RAo, N. R.AJAGOPA.L.A Avv.1NOAR and]. R. MuDHOLK.AR,jJ.) Jratan J..andl-Rt.1umption-Government's ordtr directi111 rw1mption-lf can be reviewr.d by Govemmrnt-Bombay Heredi· tary OffitM Act, 1874 (Born. 3 of 1874) 8$. 12, 74, 79. In 1944, the plaintiff moved the Government for rccum• ption of Watan Lands which were in the posscs•ion of dcfen· dants 2 to 4 and for making them over to him. The Govern· ment, after causing some e11quiry to be made, resumed those lands by its order dated October 9, 1946, and directed their restoration to the plaintiff'. Thereafter, the defendants moved the Govern men! for re-consideration of that order, and the Government modified its previou• order by directing that the defendants who were in possession of the lands, should continue to retain them but they should pay such rent as may be fixed by the Government from time t<? time. The plaintit!' instituted a suit for a declaration that the order of the Government modifying the order of October 9, 1946, was null and void and inoperative. It was contended that the order made by Government on October 9, 1946, wu a judicial order p:used by the Government in exercise or its revi. sionaljurisdic1ion under s. 79 of the Watan Act, and it was not competent for the Government to revise or review that order in the absenr.e of a provision in the Act empowering the Govern- ment to do so. The suit was decreed by the trial court, but the District J11d~c set aside the decree and the High Court conlirmc<I his d<eision. The plaiutifT came to this Court by spc(ial lra1,·c. /lel<l, that the decision of the trial court was correct and the (;ovrnnnrnt \\·as not competent to modify the order dated Octubcr~J, 1916. The scheme of certain sections of Part II of the Ilomluy Hereditary Offices Act, 1874, including ss. II and 12, discloses that a judicial or quasi._iudicial duty is imposed on the Collector to decide what is in effect a /i.i or quasi·lis between the Watanclar and the alienee of the Watan land. The whole process, including the order made under s. 3 of the Act, is quasi·.iudiciai and not adminjstrative. As the order made by ' =• I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 201 the Collector under s. 12 is not au ailministr:Ltivc order but a quasi-judicial order, it can be rectified or n1o<lillf'd or set aside by the Commissioner in appeal or hy the Statr C;o\'r-rr1n1ent in revision under s. 79 a11cl not otherwise. When an authority exercises its revisional po\vers, it ncce· ssarily acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity. Hence, the order of the Government dated October 9, 1956, must be deemed to be a judicial or quasi-judicial order. Such an order cannot be set aside or revised or modified just as an adminis- trative order can be revised or modified under s. 74. Finality attaches to the • Government's order under s. 79 and in the absence of any express provision empowering it to review the order, the subsequent order passed by the Government was ultra vires and beyond its jurisdiction. An order will be deemed to be of quasi-judicial character not only when there is a contest between one individual and another but also when the contest is between an authority pur- porting to do an act and a person opposing it, provided the statute impose.a dnty on the authority to act judicially. No period of limitation is specified in the Watan Act for preferring an application for revision. N0rmally, the Govern- ment would not interfere unless moved within a reasonable time. What should be considered as a reasonable time in a particular case, is a ma ttcr entirely for the Government to consider. In this case, the Government thought that it had strong reasons for interfering even after a long lapse of time, and that is why it interfered. It is settled law that civil courts have the power and jurisdiction to consider and decide whether a tribunal of limited jurisdiction has acted within the ambit of the powers conferred upon it by the statute to which it owes its existence or whether it has transgressed the limits placed on those powers by the leg is la ture. Gullapalli Nayeswara Rao v. Andhra Prade.,h Road Transport Corporation, [1959] I S. C, R. 319, Board of Hiqh School anrl lntermedia.te Education, U. P. Allahabad v, Ghansh- yam Das Gupta, [1962] Supp.
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