LAXMAN MAROTRAO NAVAKHARE versus KESHAVRAO S/O EKNATHSA TAPAR

Citation: [1993] 2 S.C.R. 167 · Decided: 02-03-1993 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: T.K. THOMMEN · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

LAXMAN MAROTRAO NAVAKHARE 
v. 
KESHAVRAO S/0 EKNATHSA TAPAR 
MARCH 2, 1993 
[DR. T.K. THOMMEN AND N.P. SINGH, JJ.] 
Constitution of India, j950: Article 136-S.L.P. under-Whether enter-
tainment of petition amounts to the Court converting itself into a c6Jurt of 
appeal. 
Central Provinces and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 
1949• : Clause 13-A-£ffect of-Whether benefit can be claimed if S.L.P. 
under Article 136 of the Constitution of India is pending at relevant time. 
A 
B 
c 
The suit plot was let out to the appellant as a monthly tenant for an 
automobile garage. The respondent-plaintiff issued a notice on 10th July, D 
1975 determining the lease in favonr of the appellant with effect from 31st 
July, 1975, and filed a suit for eviction. 
The trial Court dismissed the said suit on the finding that as the 
appellant was using the suit premises for manufacturing purposes, a six 
months' notice was required before the lease could be determined, and as 
the notice issued to the defendant-appellant under section 106 of the 
Transfer of Property Act had purported to determine the tenancy with 15 
days' notice, the suit in question could uot have been filed. 
On appeal by the respondent, the Assistant Judge came to the 
conclusion that the premises in question had not been let out for any 
manufacturing purpose but for a motor workshop and as such the notice 
under section 106 of the Act was valid, and the respondent was entitled to 
the possession of the plot in dispute, and passed an order for possession. 
E 
F 
The second appeal filed on behalf of the appellant was dismissed in G 
limine by the High Court saying that no substantial question of law was 
involved . 
.In the appeal to this Court, the finding recorded by the Court of 
Jc 
Appeal below and affirmed by the High Court that the respondent was 
entitled to a decree for possession, and that the appellant was liable to be H 
167 
168 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
j 1993] 2 S.C.R. 
A 
evicted was not questioned. However, a new stand was taken on behalf of ~ 
the appellant that in view of the subsequent events the decree of eviction 
passed against the appellant could not be given effect to. It was submitted 
B 
c 
that by C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control (Second 
Amendment) Order, 1989 a new clause 13A bas been introduced and that 
was during the pendency of the present appeal, and that though clause 
13-A .had been introduced not with retrospective effect still it shall be ~ 
applicable to proceedings pending before any Court including this court 
and in view of the bar imposed by. the said clause 13-A no decree for 
eviction could be passed by this court in the present appeal against the 
appellant unless the respondent-landlord produces a written permission 
----.. 
of the Controller as required by sub..:lause (1) of Clause 13 of the Order. 
[)ismissing the appeal, this Court, 
HELD: 1. Article 136(1) of the Constitution confers on this Court 
overriding and extensive powers of granting special leave to appeal. Article 
D 136 does not confer a right to appeal which is in the discretion of this 
Court. The discretionary power under Article 136 cannot be construed as 
to confer a right of appeal where none exist. Although the power under 
Article 136(1) is unfettered, it cannot be held that after having entertained 
a special leave petition against any final or interlocutory order, this court 
E 
F 
converts itself into a court of appeal for the hearing of the dispute involved 
and as such when the appeal is dismissed the decree passed by the High Y 
Court merges into the decree of this court, and in that situation amounts 
to passing a decree for eviction. [175G-H,176A] 
Gyan Chand v. Kunjbehari/a/, [1977] 3 SCC 317, referred to. [176B] 
2. The bar placed by clause 13-A of the Order shall be applicable 
only to a suit or proceeding which was pending in any court under .. '"( 
provisions of any special Act or under the provision of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, as the case may be. It shall not become applicable to a special 
G leav., petition pending or an appeal registered before this court on the 
basis of leave granted under Article 136 of the Constitution. This Court 
while exercising its discretionary power under Article 136 of the Constitu-
tion even while dismissing the appeal shall not be deemed to have passed -~ 
any decree for eviction. [177C-D] 
H 
3. The matter would have been different if clause 13-A instead of only 
'(.

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