LexLAXMAN AND OTHERS versus STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
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A B c D E F G LAXMAN AND OTHERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA November 28, 1973 [M.H. BEG AND Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.j 505 Evidence Act, Section 145-lmPortant omissions by a witness iu tlie pl'erious statements regarding participation of the accused in the crime-JVhether contradictions within the meaning of the section-Law laid down in Tahsi/dar Singh and another v. State of U. P.A. I. R. 1959 S. C. 1012 exp/ained-/lnpact of 0111issions 011 the pro-· bari~·e value of the witnesses' evidence. In the trial u/s 302 read withs. 341. P. c., one Sopan was convicted on the evi-· dence of one Sudam, the only eye-witness. Sudam admitted in his cross-exan1ina- tion that neither before the Executive Magistrate nor before the Committing Magis- trate, he stated that Sopan had beaten the deceased with Rumana and that he had· stated the fact for the first time before the trial Magistrate, . Sudam also admitted that Sopan did nothing and was simply standing there. Sudan1 also stated that he· could watch the incident for a very short time as he himself was threatened by the accused and, therefore, ran away. The F.J.R. and dying declarations also did not mention the part played by Sopan in the incident. The trial Court acquitted all the accused but the High Court convicted them. As regards the omissions in Sudam's evidence, the High Court held, following Tahsildar's case, that the omis.sions do not amount to contradictions and cannot be proved to show that the witness was making improvements. The High Court, therefore, ignored the omissions. Allowing Sopan's appeal (but not of the other two accused), HELD (i) We do not think thats. 145 of the Evidence Act, en the very reason~ ing of Tahsildar Singh's case, cited by the High Court, was intended to exclude from evidence what is relevant and admitted, and, therefore, a proved omission fron1 having its due effect in the assessment of probabilities. s. 145 of Evidence Act applies only to 'contradiction!(.' If there are omissions in previous statemeuts which do no~ amount to con!~adictions but throw some doubt on the veracity of what was omitted, the uncertainty or doubt may be capable of removal by questions in re-examination. There were no such questions put to Sudam. Neither proof nor use of Such omissions, which do not amount to contradictions is barred by s. 145 of the Evicfence Act. The error the High Court had committed was that it entirely excluded very important, relevant and material omissions, from duly proved previous statements of the witness Sudam from consideration altogether as though they were quite irrelevant and in-consequential. [51 OF] It is not possible to Jay down a general rule as to what effect a particular omission from previous statement should have on the probative value of what was so omitted by a witness. The effect will depend upon the totality of proved facts and circums· tances in which the omission ~ht have taken place. It will oflen be determined by the importance of what was onutted. The Law of Evidence contains nothing more than s. 3 and s. 114 of the Evidence Act to indicate and illustrate the standards and' methods employed in assessing the evidence. [510H] (ii) The High Court ought to have examined the evidence of Sudam, the only eye-witness, in the light of the material omissions and found out how much Sudan} actually saw with his own eyes and how much of what he said could be attributed to his conjecture, sunnise or imagination. Sopan is entitled to benefit of the doubt which emerges on an examination of the whole evidence in the case about the precisC acts of participation by him. [513D] CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Crimi~al Appeal No. 122 H of 1970. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated 24/ 25th September 1968 of the Bombay High Court in Crimina'l Appeal 1731 of 1965. 506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1974] 2 s.C.R. M. C. Bhandare and P. H. Parekh, for the appellants. H. R. Khanna and S. P. Nayar, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BEG, J.-The three appellants Laxman (aged 30 at the time ·of trial). Sopan (aged 18 at the time of trial), and Sakharam (aged 40 years at the time of trial), residents of village Walana were acquit· .ted of charges under section 302 read with section 34 I.P.C. by the learned Sessions Judge of Parbhani. The trial court had declared the testimony of the only eye witness, Sudam Sakharam, P.S. 17, to be unwort
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