LARSEN & TOUBRO LTD. CLUB HOUSE ROAD, MADRAS versus TRUSTEES OF DHARMAMURTHY, RAO BAHADUR CALAVALA CUNNAN, CHETTY'S CHARITIES BY ITS TRUSTEES

Citation: [1988] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 755 · Decided: 31-08-1988 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: SABYASACHI MUKHERJI · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

LARSEN & TOUBRO LTD. CLUB HOUSE ROAD, MADRAS 
v. 
TRUSTEES OF DHARMAMURTHY, RAO BAHADUR 
CALAV ALA CUNNAN, CHETTY'S CHARITIES 
BY ITS TRUSTEES 
AUGUST 31, 1988 
[SABYASACHI MUKHARJI ANDS. RANGANATHAN, JJ.] 
Tamil Nadu City Tenant's Protection Act (No. III of 1922)-
Whether the lessee---Company was entitled to protection under section 
9-0f-In eviction proceedings-Construction of the lease deed. 
In this appeal by special leave, the dispute arose out ofa lease by a 
charitable trust in favour of a company. The respondent· Trust filed a 
suit for possession of a property taken on lease from it by the appellant-
company. The appellant responded by filing an application claiming 
protection under section 9 of the Tamil Nadu City Tenant's Protection 
Act (the 'Act'). The application was accepted by the trial court which 
held that the company was entitled to the benefit of the Act and appoin-
ted a Commissioner to inspect the property and lix the minimum extent 
of the property required by the defendant for convenient enjoyment of 
the super-structure which it would be entitled to purchase in terms of 
section 9. 
The trustees filed an appeal, contending that the company was not 
entitled to the. protection of section 9. The appeal was allowed. The 
company preferred a revision petition before the High Court, which 
dismissed it, holding that the application of the company under section 
~was not maintainable. The company appealed to this Court, 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court, 
HELD: The short question to be decided was whether the com-
pany was entitled to the protection.under section 9 of the Act. This piece 
of legislation was enacted primarily .for the protection of small tenants, 
who in certain municipal towns and adjoining areas had constructed 
buildings on others' lands, by ensuring that they were not evicted so 
long as they paid a fair rent for the lease. The Act also contained a 
provision whereunder a tenant could put up a claim to purchase the 
land in question from the owner. [758C] 
755 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
756 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 
A 
The Act applies only to tenants in respect of land situated in 
certain areas where the tenancy has heen created before a prescribed 
date. The only controversy here was whether the lease in question couid 
be Said to be a lease of 'land'. Before a right of purchase can be exer-
cised under section .9, the tenant must be a tenant of land, not compris-
ing biiilQings ill' lands appurtenant thereto. The High Court had held 
B that there had been a lease not of the vacant land but of a building with 
the land appurtenant thereto and the-provisions of the Act would not 
apply. [764E, F-G; 765F-G] 
The case involved construction of the lease deed. The language 
employed in the lease-deed only showed that both land and building 
C were leaseit ·whether the land was to be treated as an appurtenant or 
not would depend upon the extent and nature of the land and its situa-
tion vis-a-vis the building thereon and not on whether the lease deed 
described the subject-matter as "all that land and building" or Vice 
Versa. If the deed had described the demised premises as 'building and 
appurtenant land'. that would have helped in ascertaining the intention 
D of the parties but even that would not have been conclusive. [766E-G] 
The question whether a certain land is appurtenant or not is one 
of fact. There was no reason to disturb the finding of the first appellate 
Court and the High Court that the land was appurtenant to the build-
ing, The use of the land, in the circumstances of the case, was incidental 
E. 
to the enjoyment and beneficial use of the building. [7688-D I 
The clauses of the lease deed could not be construed as consisting 
of two separate leases, one, oftbe building and the other, of the land, as 
suggested by the lessees. There were clear indications in the lease deed 
thai it was a single, indivisible lease of both the building and the vacant 
F 
land. lt was impossible to consider the document as comprising two 
ieases. It was a composite lease of a building with appurtenant land, 
and having regard to the definitions contained in the Act, the lessee 
was not entitled to the rights conferred by section 3 or section 9 of the 
Act. [i69D; 770F] 
G 
Whether the Act applied to the lease or not was something which 
had to be considered on the terms of the lease deed, having regard to the 
nature of the property. The clause regarding remo

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.