LALIT NARAYAN MISHRA INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE, PATNA, ETC. versus STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. ETC.

Citation: [1988] 3 S.C.R. 311 · Decided: 23-03-1988 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: RANGANATH MISRA · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 2 judgment(s) · cites 3 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

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312 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1988] 3 S.C.R. 
Allowing the writ petitions (Civil) Nos. 87 of 1987 and 439 of 1987 
and Civil Appeal No. 4141of1986, in so far as they related to the order 
of termination of the services of Dr. Jagadanand Jha, and dismissing 
the writ petitions (Civil) Nos. SS of 1987 and 431 of 1987 and Civil 
Appeal No. 4142of1986, the Court, 
HELD: The provisions of the Act are the same as those of the two 
Ordinances Nos. IS and 30 of 1986. The first attack on the validity of 
the Act and the Ordinances was founded on the plea of violation of Article 
14 of the Constitution. It was contended that the Act and the Ordi· 
nances were discriminatory in nature and violative of Article 14 of the 
Constitution of India and should be struck down. The contention was 
wholly misconceived. The Ordinances were not promulgat~ and the 
Act was not passed for the purpose of nationalisation of the Institute 
only. It was apparent from the provisions of the Ordinances and the Act 
that the private educational institutions as defined therein were to be 
taken for the purpose as mentioned in the Preambles to the Ordinances 
and the Act In a phased manner. All the Institutions which answered the 1
D 
description given in section 2(a) of the Act were to be nationalised. It 
was not correct to say that the Institute had been slgnled out for 
nationalisation. [3I9E; 321D; 3230-F] 
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F 
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There can be no doubt that when nationalisation had to be done in 
a phased manner, all the institutions cannot be taken over at a time. 
The nationalisation in a phased manner contemplates that by and by the 
object of nationalisation will be taken over. In implementing the 
nationalisation of the private institutions In phased manner, the Legis-
lature had started with the Institute, and the question of singling out the 
Institute or treating it as a class by itself did not arise. It was the 
legislative decision that the Institute should be taken over In the first 1 
phase of nationalisation. The Legislature had not left it to the discretion 
of the executive government for the purpose or selecting the private 
educational institution for the first phase. It was very difticult to assail a 
legislative decision. Of course, a legislative decision can be assailed if it 
is violative of any provision of part III of the Constitution. So far as 
Article 14 was concerned, the Court did not think that it had any 
manner of application Inasmuch as the question of discrimination did 
not arise as soon as it was conceded that It was a case of nationalisation 
in a phased manner and that for the first phase the Institute had been 
chosen by the Legislature itself. The Institute had been chosen by the 
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legislative process. It was true that the Ordinances were promulgated •'
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under Article 213 of the Constitution., but it could not be characterised 
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H as an executive act. In· any even, ultimately, the Legislature itself had 
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L.N.M. INSTITUTE v. STATE OF BJHAR 
313 
passed the Act with the inclusion of the Institute in the Schedule thereto 
A 
as the only institution to he nationalised in the first phase. Even assum-
ing that the question of discrimination might arise also for the purpose 
of selection for the first phase, there were justifiable reasons for select-
ing the Institute for the first phase of nationalisation; the State had 
changed the name of the Institute, provided the site for the Institute, got 
the building constructed through its own agencies and funds and 
B 
supervised the prescription of syllabi. The fact could not be excluded 
that since 1975 it is the State of Bihar nnrturing the Institute, spending 
money and exercising necessary control over it, and these facts fully 
juftified the propriety of legislative wisdom in selecting the Institute for 
nationalisation in the first phase. [323G-H; 324B-C; 325C-E] 
There could be no doubt that on the date the -Ordinances were 
pri.mulgated and the Act was passed, the same could not be challenged 
c 
on the ground of non-implementation of the legislative intent in 
nationalising similar institutes by amending the Schedule. If a legisla-
tive enactment cannot be challenged as discriminatory on the date it is 
passed, it is difficult to challenge the same as violative of Article 14 of D 
the Constitution on the ground of inaction of the executive in imple-
menting the purposes of the Act, regard being had to the fact that it was 
the Legislature w

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