LALA HARI CHAND SARDA versus MIZO DISTRICT COUNCIL & ANR.

Citation: [1967] 1 S.C.R. 1012 · Decided: 28-10-1966 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K. SUBBA RAO · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 3 judgment(s) · cites 1 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

LALA HARi CHAND SARDA 
A 
v. 
MIZO DISTRICT COUNCIL & ANR. 
October 28, 
1966 
[K. SVD!IA RAO, C. J., R. S. BACHAWAT A!'ID J.M. SHELAT, JJ.} 
B 
L11shai Hills 
Disirict (Irading by 
no11-Triba/s) 
Regulation (2 o/ 
.1963)., s. 3-Trading licence •to 11on-Tribal-lf 
violative of Art. 19 of 
the Constitwion--Co11stitutio11 of India, An. 19(1J(g)-/f loits s. 3 of 
L11sltai HI/ls District Regulation. 
'The Executive Committee of Mizo District Council refusod to further 
renew the temporary licence issued to 
the appellant, a non-1rader, 
for 
trading in Mizo District. Tho licence could be issu-od for one year only 
C 
and the appellant was trading after applying and obtaining its renewal 
from time to time. The appellant filed a writ petition, contending, that 
the order was ma/a fide in the sense that though the reason given for re-
fusal was that the number of non-Tribal traders had reached the maximum, 
the Committee had in fact granted licences to new traders, and that the 
S>id order and s. 3 of the Lushai Hills District (Trading by non-Tribals) 
Regulation, 1953 was invalid 
bein~ violative of Art. 19( 1) (g) of the 
D 
Constitution. 
The High Court mamtained the order. 
In appeal to this 
·Court. 
HELD : (Per Subba Rao, C. J. and Shelat, J.) : Section 3 of the 
Regulation is violative of Art, 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. 
Even if the Sixth Schedule can be said to contain a policy and the 
Regulation may be •aid to have been enacted 
in pursuance of such a 
policy an analysis of the Regulation •hows that that is not sufficient. Even 
1f a statute lays down a policy it is conceivabk that its implementation 
may be left in such aa arbitrary manner that the statute providing for 
such implemenation would amount to an 
unreasonable 
restriction. A 
provision which leaves an unbridled power to an authority cannot in any 
sense be characteris..ed as reasonable. 
Section 3 of the Regulation is one 
such provision. 
The Regulation contain.~ no principle or criterion on which the Exe-
cutive Committee should grant or refuse ro grant a licence or its renewal; 
nor does it provide any machin·~ry under which an applicant can !how 
.cause why his application for a licence or its renewal should not be re-
jected; nor does it provide any superior a~thority before whom such an 
applicant can establish that the refusal by the Commit!.,. is arbitrary or 
without any proper cause; and it leaves the trader not only at the mercy 
·of the Committee but also without any remedy. 
In the pre;ent case, the Committee had given the reason for refusal to 
renew the licence, but the order did 
not state what that maximum wa! 
·or who prescribed such a number and under what authority or what was 
1he criterion for fixing any particular maximum. 
[1020 D; 1021 A-Pl 
(Per Bachawat, J. dissenting) : Section 3 of the Regulation 
is not 
violative of Arts. 14 and 19(l)(g) of the Constitution. 
If paragraph I 0 of the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution cannot be 
·regarded as violative of any provision in the Constitution, it is impossible 
to saJ that s. 3 of the Regulation which is in strict coaformity with yara-
graph 10 i• violative of Art•. 14 and 19(1) (g). The protection o the 
E 
G 
H 
f 
• 
• 
•. 
HARICHAND v. MIZO DIST. COUNCIL (She/at, J.) 
1013 
A 
interests ?f the Sched)Jled .Tribes is to !Je ~he guiding. policy regulating. 
the exercISe of the dIScretion of the D1Str1ct 
Council Ill the matter of 
granting or withholding trading licences to non-tribal traders. 
B 
c 
In the present case, the Executive Committee found that the maximum 
limit of non-trihal traders had been reaclred, and in the interest of the 
tribal it was not desirable to issue licence to more non.tribal traders. It 
was neither alleged nor shown that the Committee discriminated between 
similarly situated persons. 
[1023 G; 1024 C-D; 1025 H] 
CIVIL APPELLATE 
JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 648 
of 1964. 
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated 
November 23, 1960 of Assam and Nagaland High Court in Civil. 
Rule No. 88 of 1960. 
Sukumar Ghose, for the appellant. 
The respondent did not appear. 
The Judgment of SUBBA RAO, c. J. and SHELAT, J. was delive-
red by SHELAT., J. BACHAWAT, J. delivered a dissenting Opinion. 
11 
Shelat, J. 
We regret our inability to agree with the conclusion 
reached by Bacha wat J. 
The appellant, a non-tribal, started trading at Aijal, Mizo 
District, in 1957 under a temporary licence issued by the Mizo 
District Council inv

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