LALA BALMUKUND (DEAD) THROUGH L.RS. versus LAJWANTI AND ORS.

Citation: [1975] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 44 · Decided: 01-04-1975 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: Y.V. CHANDRACHUD · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

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LALA BALMUKUND (DEAD) THROUGH L.RS. 
v. 
LAJW ANTI AND ORS. 
April 1, 1975 
[Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, R. S. SARKARIA AND A. C. GUPTA, JJ.J 
Interpretation of Statutes-Statutes prescribing law of limitation-Construction 
of an ambiguous provision-Interpretation producing penalising efiect, whether 
permissible. 
Limitation Act, 1908, Section 12(2) "time requisite for obtaining a copy 
of the decree"-aTime requisite", meaning of-Period <>f delay in 
preparing 
the decree, when can be excluded. 
One Roshan Lai' and two others filed a suit in the Court of Munsif Havali, 
Lucknow against Balmukund and another for dissolution of partnership, rendi-
tion of accounts and recovery. The suit was finally heard and decided by the 
Munsif as per his judgmen4 dated 30-10-1956, in these terms: 
"Defendant No. 1 Lala Balmukand shall pay a 
total 
sum of 
Rs. 15,927 /2/- to the plaintiffs in which they have equal shares. Plaintiffs 
shall also get their costs from defendant No. I. Let a final decree be pre-
pared accordingly provided necessary court-fee is paid by the plaintiffs 
within one month." 
The plaintiffs did not pay the court-fee within the time origiruiny fixed in 
the. judgment They asked for extension of time which was granted without 
notice to the other side. 
The plaintiffs then deposited the necessary court-fee 
within this extended time, on 18-1-1957. About 12 days thereafter, on 30-1-1957, 
the final decree was drawn up and signed. 
The appellant (defendant No. 1) made an application for obtaining a copy 
of the judgment on 14-11-1956, The copy was prepared and delivered to the 
appellant on 16-11-1956. On 26-11-1956 i.e. about two months before the decree 
was actually dra\vn up and signed, the appellant made an application ·-for a 
copy of the decree. The copy was prepared and delivered to counSel for the 
appellant on 1-2-1957. Information about the supply of this copy was received 
by the appellant at Delhi on 3-2-1957. 
Against the judgment and decree of the Munsif, the defendant filed ail 
appeal on 12-2-1957 before the Additional Civil Judge, Lucknow. Along with 
the Memorandum of Appeal, he submitted an application under s. 5 of the 
Limitation Act, for -condonation of delay in respect of the period from 6-2-.1957. 
By his judgment dated 14-2-1957, the Judge dismissed the appeal as. time-
barred. The second appeal preferred by the defendant w~s also dismissed by 
the High Court. This appeal is based on the special leave granted by this 
Court. 
On behalf of the appellant it was contended that the Additional Civil 
Judge had exercised his discretion under s. 5 of the Limitation Act in a groasly 
unjust and unreasonable manner in not condoning the d~lay. It was_ also con-
tended thai the entire period between the date of the judgment and the sign~ 
ing of the decree, in the circumsta·nces of this case,- was the. "time requisite" 
for obtaining a copy of the decree and should have l?een excluded,. as such 
under s. 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1?08. 
Allowing the appeal, 
HELD : (i) Jn the courts below, the appellant did not take up th<O pl~ 
that the delay was due to wrong advice of the Counsel or that the appellant . 
·--
l!ALMUKUND v. LAJWANTI (Sarkaria, 1.) 
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was labouring under any mistake or, misapprehension of law. The case then 
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set up .·by . him was that being a patient of heart disease,· he ·remained confined, 
under medical advice, to bed. He was fit enough to travel on the 10th February, 
bnt for want of funds he could not reach Lucknow f.rom Delhi .on the 11th 
February. He produced a post-dated medical certificate, but did not examine 
the Doctor concerned. The appellant had an adult son who used to look after 
the case. In these circumstances, it could not be said that the first appellate 
court exercised its discretionary power perversely or illegally so as. to warrant 
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interference by the High Court in second appeal,. [47D-E] 
(ii) Limitation Act deprives or restricts the right of an aggrieved person 
to have recourrse to legal remedy,· and where its language is ambigUous, that 
construction should be preferred which preserves such remedy to the one which 
bars or defeats it. A court ought to avoid an interpretation upon a statute of 
Limitation by ·implication or inference as may have a penalising effect unless 
it is driven to do so by the .irrreoistible force of the language employed by the 
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legislature. [50AJ 
(iiii) Tiie expression •'time requisite" in the ph

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