LAL SURAJ @ SURAJ SINGH & ANR. versus STATE OF JHARKHAND
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[2008] 17 S.C.R. 1059 ~ LAL SURAJ @ SURAJ SINGH & ANR. A \I. STATE OF JHARKHAND , "- (Criminal Appeal No. 2062 of 2008) . DECEMBER 18, 2008 B [S.B. SINHA AND CYRIAC JOSEPH, JJ.] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s. 319 - ... I Summoning of other persons appearing to be guilty of offence under - Power of - Held: Is wide but is to be exercised very c sparingly - Before summoning an accused, trial court must ' form opinion on basis of evidences brought before it that case โข has been made out that such person could be tried together with the other accused - Person not charge sheeted, may come within the purview of description of person as contained o, - in s.319- On facts, appellants were not charge sheeted and also not named in FIR - Deposition of prosecution witnesses relied upon by courts below while allowing the application to '"'\ summon appellants not reliable - No substantial evidence on record to make out a case against appellants - Thus, order of courts below set aside. E The question which arose for consideration in this appeal was whether the courts below relying on evidence of prosecution witnesses were justified in allowing the application for summoning the appellants in exercise of his power uls. 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, F 1973. ;. -~ Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. Section 319 Cr.P.C. is a special provision. It seeks to meet an extraordinary situation. It although confers a power of wide amplitude but is required to be G ' exercised very sparingly. Before an order summoning an accused is passed, the trial court must form an opinion '., ~ on the basis of the evidences brought before it that a case has been made out that such person could be tried 1059 H - " โข 1060 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R. ..... A together with the other accused. Even if a person had not been charge sheeted, he may come within the purview of the description of such a person as contained in s. 319 .. of the Code. [Paras 11 and 12] [1065-8-D] ' 1.2. The principle of strong suspicion may be a B criterion at the stage of framing of charge as all the materials brought during investigation were required to be taken into consideration, but, for the purpose of summoning a person, who did not figure as accused, a different legal principle is required to be applied. A court ~A 1 c framing a charge would have before it all the materials on record which were required to be proved by the prosecution .. In a case where, however, the court , exercises its jurisdiction under Section 319 of the Code, " the power has to be exercised on the basis of the fresh evidence brought before the court. There lies a fine but D clear distinction. [Par:~ 15] [1066-G-H; 1067-A-B] 2.1. The prosecution concededly did not file any chargesheet against the appellants. Even in the First Information Report only the appellant No. 1 was. named. r t- The case was committed to the Court of Sessions. There E cannot be any doubt or dispute that although a person named in the First Information Report-or another who was found to be involved in the commission of the offence may be summoned at a subsequent stage by the ., trial judge, legality of an order summoning such an ., F accused, however, would depend on the nature of evidence brought on __ record by the prosecution witnesses and other relevant factors. [Paras 8 and 9] , "" [1064-A-C] ~- 2.2. The Sessions Judge as also the High Court relied G upon the deposi_tlon of PW-6 and PW-7. PW-6 is not an eye-witness to the occurrence. PW-7 is only hearsay witness. No evid~nce worth the name had been brought on record to arrive at a satisfaction that there was a reasonable prospect of conviction of the appellants. The f-- approach of the Sessions Judge was wholly incorrect. H [Paras 13 and 14] [1066-B, F, G] -'" โข ' LAL SURAJ@ SURAJ SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF 1061 JHARKHAND 2.3. Applying the legal principles to the fact of the A case, Sessions Judge as also the High Court committed , a serious error in passing the impugned judgment. On the ยท basis of the aforementioned evidence, there was no possibility of recording a judgment of conviction against โข the appellants at all. Thus, the impugned order are set B aside. [Para 21] [1069-E-F] Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi (1983) 1 SCC 1; Yuvaraj Ambar Mohite v. State of, Maharashtra (2006) 1 O SCALE 369; Guriya alias Tabass
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