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LAKSHMIRATTAN COTTON MILLS versus COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U.P.

Citation: [1969] 1 S.C.R. 951 · Decided: 03-09-1968 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: J.C. SHAH · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

• 
A 
LAKSHMIRATIAN COTION MILIS 
v. 
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U.P. 
September 3, 1968 
B 
(J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.] 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
Income-tax Act (11 of 1922), ss. !0(2)(xv), 66(1), (2) and (4)-
T ermination of managinJ? agency-No evidence of services 
don~ 
by 
managing agent-Payment of compensation fvr termination-If 
permis-
sible deduction under s. 10(2) (xv). 
Questions not raised in application under s. 6Gf 1) and (2)-:-lurisdic-
tion of High Court to direct Tribunal to state case on such question under 
s. 66(4). 
The shares in the a·ssessee-company were held in equal moieties by nvo 
families. 
Four members of each family, together, formed a partnership 
firm and by a managing agency agreement the ao;~ss<e appointed the fir!" 
as· its managing agent. 
In 1943, one of the fatnll!es was represented m 
tb.e firm by two women and two minors. The management o~ the asses.see 
was carried on by two df the four members of the other farruly who were 
the partners in the fi'rm. 
Those two members were also directors of the 
assessee-company. 
Disputes arose between 
the two 
families 
and the 
assessee terminated the managing agency with effect from September 30, 
1944. Thereupon the members of the two families asserting that they, 
as partners of the firm we're interested in the mdD.agiug agency, claimed 
compensation from the assessee for wrongful ts1niuation of the agency. 
The dispute between the firm and the assessee was referred to arbitration, 
and in pursuance of the award the 
assessee paid Rs. 
18,90,000 to the 
firm and Rs. 13,300 were disbW:sed as expenses of arbitration. 
The assessee claimed the payment of Rs. 19,03,300 as a permissible 
allowance under s. 10(2) (xv) of the Income-ta>. Act, 
1922, 
but 
the 
Income-tax Offioer, Appellate Assistant Comm '.ssioner and the Appellate 
Tribunal disallowed the claim. 
The assessee thcu filed 
an application 
under s. 66(1) for stating a case for the opinion ot tile High Court, but 
the Tribunal rejected the apolication. The assessee then moved the High 
Court under s. 66(2) for directing the Tribunal to state a case in respect 
of two questions. 
On the 
direction of the High Court, the Tribunal 
referred to the High Court the question : 
Whether there was material 
on which the Tribunal could haye come to the conclusion that 
Rs. 19,03,300 were not spent by the assessee wholly and exclusively for 
the purpose of its business. The assessee, thereafter, filed another appli· 
cation before the High Court for referring additional 
questions 
which 
were not incorporatqj. in ~he applications under s. 66(1) or (2); and the 
High Court, in purported exercise of the power under s. 66( 4) directed 
the Tribunal to submit another statement with respect to the additional 
questions and the Tribunal complied with the order. 
At the hearing of the reference, the High Court was of the view that 
it had no jurisdiction under s. 66( 4) to direct the Tribunal to submit the 
second st-atement and declined to record format answers on the additional 
questions. On the original question, the Hip;h Court held that there was 
material on which the Tribunal could hold that the allowance claimed 
\ras not spent wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the asS>essee's 
businesil and confirmed the Tribunal's order. 
.. 
• 
• 
.. 
• 
• 952 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(1969] J S.C.R . 
, In appeal 
~o this. C"-?ui: •. on !he qu_estions : \I) \V'hcthcr th!! High 
C~oun acted vtnhout 1un'id1cllon, 1n calling for 1he second statement of 
'?s7; .and (2) ~hether there was material before the Ttihunal h· justify 
11 1n 1ls conclu\1on. 
A 
HELD : (I) In an application under s. 66(2). the High C.ourl cannot 
cft<lcr rhat a case he stated on auestion<; which \\.·ere not inclu<.!i.!<l ia the 
application under s. 66(1). 
Po"·er under s. 66(-1l. n1;1y he cxcr~ised lo 
call for a supplementary statement only when the t:ourt is :,Jlisl~-:d that 
B 
the !itatcmcnt in 1he cac;e referred under s. 66( 1) or (2) is not '.:1.,;ffic:cnt 
to enable it to determine the question raised 
by 
that 
stalcmrnr. 
The 
power cannot he exercised for calling for anoth\.T ~1:1:..:1n~nt on "-!Uestion~ 
not referred hy lh·;! ·rribunal. 
Therefore, the t1(ocedurc rollov;c~ by the 
l·ligh Court. in exercise of the power under s. 66( 4), ~3iiin2 for ::n addi-
tional statement of case on questions which \Vere not 111cor?orat-:d in the 
applications umkr s. 66(1) and (2) was irregular. (963 G-H; 964

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