LAKHI PRASAD AGARWAL versus NATHMAL DOKANIA

Citation: [1969] 2 S.C.R. 41 · Decided: 06-09-1968 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: M. HIDAYATULLAH · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

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A 
B 
c 
D 
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F 
G 
H 
LAKHI PRASAD AGARWAL 
v. 
NATHMAL DOKANIA 
September 6, 1968 
[M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J. AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.] 
Representation of the People Act, 1951 s. 123(2), (3) and (4)-Alle-
gations of corrupt practice-Necessity of proper pleadings-Contentions 
cannot b,e considered if not borne out by pleadings-Arrest of candidate 
immediately before election-Whether inference of mala fide or collusion 
with opposing candidate can be drawn. 
The election of the respondent to the Bihar Legislative Assembly 
at the 1967 general election was challenged by the appe!lant--0ne of the 
defeated candidates-in an election petition. 
Annexure 2 to the petition 
was a pamphlet alleged to have been issued by the respondent an.cl his 
supporters in which reference was made to the call of two Muslim reli-
gious heads that Muslims should not vote for the Congress party to which 
Islam was opposed. 
The High Court dismissed 
the election 
petition 
whereupon appeal was filed in this Court. The appellant urged that (i) 
In the aforesaid pamphlet an attempt was made to induce muslim voters 
not to vote for a Congress candidate in opposition to the mandate of two 
named religious heads and this amounted to the corrupt practice of 
"undue influence" under s. 123(2) of the Representation of the People 
Act 1951; (ii) The reference to the mandate of Islam amounted to the 
use of a religious symbol within the mischief of s. 123 (3); (iii) The s·aid 
pamphlet also came within the mischief in s. 123 ( 4); (iv) The Returning 
Officer who was also the Sub-Divisional Officer of the Dist'rict ordered 
the arrest of the appellant immediately before the election; this was done 
mala fide, in collusion with the. respondent and the appellant was thereby 
hampered in his election campaign. 
HELD : (i) The pleadings in the appellant's election petition did not 
permit consideration of his contention based on s. 123(2) of the Act. 
In order that a pleading may be sufficient to make out a case 
of 
undue influence it must set out full particulars of it in compliance with 
s. 83(1)(c) of the Act comparable to Order 6 r. 4 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure. The said provision of the Act read with s. 123 ( 2) makes 
it obligatory on a party setting up a case of corrupt practice by exercise 
of undue influence as suggested, to give full 11articulars thereof by stating 
inter alia who attempted to induce electors to believe that voting for a 
particular person would render them objects of divine displeasure or 
spiritual censure and in what manner such 
attempts 
were 
made. The 
real charge in the relevant )1aragraph of the petition in the present case 
was that the pamphlet complained of misled the elector.1 hy false state-
ments. 
Such a pleading falls short of an allegation of tl'lldue intluenoe 
by an attempt to make electors exercise their franchise in a particular 
manner. 
[43 H-44 CJ 
(ii) The contention that the case fell under s. 123(3) because of the 
use of the mandate of Islam as a religious symbol was also not borne 
out by the pleadings and therefore could not be considered. [44 DJ 
(iii) To bring the case under s. 123(4) there must be a publication 
by the candidate or his agent of any statement of same' fact which is 
2Sup. Cl/69-4 
42 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1969] 2 S.C.R. 
false, and which is believed to be false or not believed to be true, in re-
lation to the personal character or conduct of any candidate, or in 
relation to the candidature or withdrawal of any candidate being 
a 
statement reasonably calculated to prejudice the prospects of that candi-
date's election. The pamphlet in question did not cast any aspersion 
l()D the personal character or conduct of the election petitioner. 
Nor was 
ithere any false statement in relation to the candidature1 of the petitioner. 
:Section 123(4) was therefore not attracted to the case. [44 E-F] 
(iv) The evidence in the case did not prove that the Returning Officer 
'Caused the appellant to be arrested mala fide or in collusion with the res-
pondent. The arrest immediately before the election surely 
hampered 
the campaign of the election petitioner, but by itself the mere fact of 
arrest does not lead to the conclusion that the Returning Officer was try-
ing to bring pressure on the election petitioner not to contest the election 
A 
B 
and much less that the arrest was made in collusion with the successful 
C 
candidate. [45 G] 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: 
Civi

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