LexLAKHAN versus STATE OF M.P.
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[2010] 9 S.C.R. 705 LAKHAN v. STATE OF M.P. (Criminal Appeal No. 2297 of 2009) AUGUST 09, 2010 [P. SATHASIVAM AND DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, JJ.] Evidence Act, 1872: A B s. 32 - Dying declaration, recorded by magistrate/police c officer - Evidentiary value of - Held: Dying declaration recorded by magistrate stands on a higher footing than the declaration recorded by officer of lower rank provided that there is no circumstance giving rise to any suspicion about its truthfulness - In the instant case, first dying declaration 0 recorded by magistrate wherein deceased stated that she got . burnt accidently not supported by medical evidence - The second declaration recorded by police two days later stood corroborated not only by the medical evidence but also by oral dying oral declarations made by the deceased to her E parents who were examined in the court - Conviction rightly based on second dying declaration by courts below discarding the first declaration - Concurrent findings of courts below not interfered with - Penal Code, 1860 - s. 302 - Bride burning - Maxim "Nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire". F The prosecution case was that the appellant was married to the victim (deceased) in June, 1999. In Feb., 2000, the deceased was brought to hospital by her in- laws in burnt condition. The statement of the deceased was recorded by the magistrate wherein she stated that G she got burnt accidentally. The said statement was recorded after the doctor certified that the deceased was in a fit mental condition to give the statement. Two days later, PW-19, a police officer recorded the second 705 H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 9 S.C.R. A statement of the deceased wherein she stated that the appellant brought a 'kuppi' full of kerosene and poured it on her body; thereafter, the fire was lit by him by a lamp and she was burnt. She also stated that she was brought to the hospital by her in-laws She died after three weeks. 8 The trial court held that the appellant was guilty for commission of offence under Section 302 IPC. The High Court upheld the order of conviction. The order of conviction was challenged in the instant appeal. c Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. The doctrine of dying declaration is enshrined in the legal maxim "Nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire", which means "a man will not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth". The doctrine of dying o declaration is enshrined in Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 as an exception to the general rule contained in Section 60 of the Evidence Act, which provides that oral evidence in all cases must be direct i.e. it must be the evidence of a witness, who says he saw it. E The dying declaration is, in fact, the statement of a person, who cannot be called as witness and, therefore, cannot be cross-examined. Such statements themselves are relevant facts in certain cases. The law is that if the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and made F voluntarily by the deceased, conviction can be based solely on it, without any further corroboration. It is neither a rule of law nor of prudence that a dying declaration cannot be relied upon without corroboration. When a dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be relied upon without having corroborative evidence. The court G has to scrutinize the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased must be in a fit state of mind to make the declaration and must identify H LAKHAN v. STATE OF M.P. 707 the assailants. Merely because a dying declaration does A not contain the details of the occurrence, it cannot be rejected and in case there is merely a brief statement, it is more reliable for the reason that the shortness of the statement is itself a guarantee of its veracity. If the dying declaration suffers from some infirmity, it cannot alone B form the basis of conviction. Where the prosecution version differs from the version given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. [Paras 8, 9] [714-B-H; 715-A] Kusha/ Rao v. State of Bombay AIR 1958 SC 22; Rasheed Beg & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1974 SC 332; K. R. Reddy & Anr. v. The Public Prosecutor AIR 1976 SC 1994; State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti c · Laxmipati Naidu AIR 1981 SC 617; Uka Ram v. State of Rajasthan (2001) 5 SCC 254; Babula/ & Ors. v. St
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