LAJWANTI versus LAL CHAND AND ORS.

Citation: [1968] 3 S.C.R. 506 · Decided: 22-03-1968 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: J.C. SHAH · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

LAJWANTI 
v. 
LAL CHAND AND ORS. 
March 22, 1968 
[J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.J 
East Punjab Factories (Control of DisnwntUng) Act 19411, s. 3-
Whether bars execution of delivecy of possession. 
Execution of Decree-No appeal from earlier execution application-
Fresh application, if barred by res judicata-S. 3 of East Punjab Factories 
(Control of Dismantling) Act, if bars. 
The eviction of the respondent from the appellant's premises, which 
\\'38 used as a factory, was decreed and application for execution of an 
order for p~ssession was made. 
The respondents resisted the execution 
on the plea that the machinery installed in the factory could not be re-
moved without the prior permission of Chief Inspector Of Factories as 
provided by the East Punjab Factories (Control of Dismantling) Act. The 
execution of the decree in so far as it involved the dismantling or removal 
of the machinery was stayed, but the p0ssession of the other part of the 
premises was allowed. Both parties appealed. The appellate Court took 
the view that the machinery and spare parts were lying practically in all 
the rooms, and the locking and sealing of the factclry would result in its 
closure which would be against the provisions of the Act, and therefore 
directed the appellant to pursue the matter with the State Government. 
Thfa order dated April 22, 1953 was not challenged by any appeal. But 
the appellant restarted th" execution proceedings in which it was held 
that the State Government had refused permission for demolition of the 
factory, so the file was ordered to be consigned to the record room. The 
appOUant filed ~n appeal, which was dismissed, but in further revision the 
High Court by its order dated July 13, 1955 observed that on the record 
it wa:s not possible to decide whether the execution of the decree would 
defeat the provisions of s. 3 of the Act, so it set aside the order and 
directed the executing court to give decision on points that arose under 
s. 3 of the Act, The executing court found that the provisions of the Act 
did not prohibit the execution and as such the respondents were liable to 
ejectment but since the application had become over a year Old it would 
be struck off the file with liberty to make a fresh application. The res-
pondents appealed. 
The District Judge held that the Act did not apply 
to involuntary dismant1ing of factories and that the issue raised by the 
ex-ecuting court did not arise but in fact it had been decided against the 
appOUant by the High Court in revision. The appellant's appeal to High 
Court was dismissed by a Single Judge, and in the Letters Patent Appeal, 
it \Vas held that the delivery of possession was not barred in execution 
of decree by the Act, but the matter had become res judicala in conse~ 
quenee of the decisions in the first execution application and the decision 
of the High Court dated July 13, 1955 in the second execution applica-
tion. Allowing the appeal, 
HELD : The Act does not bar the deJivery of possession in execution 
of a decree. It makes no re1ference to any decree for possession against 
the owner of a factory. 
By ordering delivery of possession of the pre-
mises. the executing court does not make an order for dismantling a 
factdry and a bailiff charged with execution of a warrant for possession 
does not infringe the provision of law by rendering possession of the 
proper!• to the decree·holder. [510 C-DJ 
8 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
II 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
LAJWANTI v. LAL CHAND (Mitter, J.) 
507 
There was no final order about the inexecutability of the decree on the 
first application for execution. Further the High Court by its order dated 
July 13, 1955, did not .decide the question as to whether the decree for 
J>OSSCSSion would be inexecutable in. \iew of the Act. It stated expressly 
that it \\o·as not possible for it t~ dcdde whether the execution of the de-
cree 1,1,·ould defeat the provisions of the Act, and being unable to come 
to a decision on the record it r·~manded the matter to the court of execu· 
tion. 
It found itself unable to interpret the section on the evidence 
hefore it. 
The proceedings subsequent to the remand order culminated 
in the order of the Division Bench from which the present appeal a'rose. 
The order dated July 13, 1955 was not a final order which put a ~eat on 
the proceedinp, [510 F-H] 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 687 of 
1965. 
Appeal by special leave from the judgment a

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