LACHMANDAS KEW ALRAM AHUJA AND ANOTHER versus THE STATE OF BOMBAY

Citation: [1952] 1 S.C.R. 710 · Decided: 20-05-1952 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: M. PATANJALI SASTRI · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

1952 
MRy 20 
710 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
LACHMANDAS KEW ALRAM AHUJA 
AND ANOTHER 
fl. 
[1952] 
THE STATE OF BOMBAY. 
[PATANJALI SAsTRI C.J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, 
MuKHERJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR, JJ.] 
Constt.tution of India, 
.tlrts. 13, 14-Bombay Public Safety 
Measures 
Act, 1947, s. 12-Provision empowering Government to 
refer 'cases' 
for trial by 
Special 
Judge-Validity-Discriminatior> 
-Proceedings commenced before 26th January, 195(), before Special 
fudge-Procedure 
discriminatory-Continuation 
of 
trial 
under 
special 
procedure-Validity of trial-Applicability 
of 
Constitution 
to pe"nding trials. 
field, pe1· :MAHAJAN, 
MuKHERJEA, 
DAs and 
CHANDRASEKHAR/. 
ArYAll, JJ. (PATANJAL! SASTR! C. J. 
dissenting).-Section 12 of the 
Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947; in so far, at any rate~ 
as it authorises 
the Govern1nent to direct particular "cases" to 
be tried by a Special Judge appointed under the Act does not 
purport to proceed 
on any 
classification and therefore 
contra-
venes Art. 14 of the Constitution and is void under Art. 13 on the 
pr!aciples laid down in the cases of State of Bengal 
v., Anwa1 
Ali Sarkar ([1952] S.C.R. 284) and Kathi Raning Raf{)at v. Th, 
State of Saurashtra ([1952) S.C.R. 435). 
'fhe appellants 
who 
were 
accused 
of 
having 
con11nitted 
xnurder 
and other serious 
offences 
were directed by the Govern-
n1ent of Bombay by an order made on the 6th August, 1949, to be 
tried 
under the Bombay Public Safety Measures Act by a Special 
JuJgc 
appointed under 
the Act, 
charges were fra1ned 
against 
then1 on the 13th January, 
1950, and they 
\Vere convicted in 
March, 
1950. On 
appeal it 
was contended 
before 
the 
High 
Court that the trial and conviction \Vere illegal as the Bombay 
Public Safety 
Measures Act was void under Art. 13 read \Vith 
r\rt. 
14 of the Constitution 
which 
came into force on the 26th 
]:Jnuary, 1950, but the 1-Iigh Court held that as the procee<lings: 
a.gain~t the accused had commenced before the Constitution, the 
provisions of Arts. 13 and 14 did not apply and the conviction 
\Vas not illegal. 
Held, by a ma1or1ty, that although substantive rights and 
liabilities acquired or accrued before the 
date of the Constitution 
remain enforceable, it caqnot be held that after that date, thosc-
-
rights or liabilities must be enforced 
under the particular pro-
1-' ~ 
cedure that \vas in force before that date, although it has since 
that date been repealed or come 
into conflict 
with the funda-
mental • right to equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 
S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
711 
Constitution, as there is no vested right in procedure. The fact 
of 
reference of "cases" to the Special 
Judge before the Con-
1titution came 
into force has no 
reasonable 
relation 
to the 
objects sought 
to be achieved by 
the Act, the 
discrimination 
therefore continued after the Constitution came into force and 
~uth continuation of the application of the discriminatory pro-
cedure to the cases of the appellants after the date of the Con-
stitution constituted a b.-each of the fundamental right guaran-
teed by Art. 14, and the appellants were therefore entitled to be 
tried 
under the ordinary procedure 
after 
the 
date 
of 
the 
Constitution. 
PATANJALI SASTRI 
C. ]. 
(contra).-Granting that s. 
12 
of 
the Bombay Act must, in view of 
the decision in 
Anwar Ali 
Sarkar' s case, be held to be discriminatory and void in so far as 
it empowers the State Government to refer individual cases to :i 
Special Judge for ·trial, the trial of 
the appellants which had 
validly started before the Special Judge who had be~n empower· 
ed to try the case cannot be vitiated by the Constitution subse-
quently coming into force. 
The provisions 
of 
the 
Constitution 
relating to fundamental rights have no retrospective operation 
and do not affect a criminal prosecution commenced before the 
Constitution came into force. 
The jurisdiction of the Special Judges validly created and 
exercised before tl1e Constitution and their competence to try 
the cases referred to them cannot be affected by the special pro-. 
ccdure 
becoming 
discriminatory. 
The 
correct 
view 
is 
that 
Art. 14 does lnot affect 
pencJling trials even in matters of 
procedure. 
Moreover the appellants against whom proceedings 
had been commenced before the Special Judge, were not in the 
same situation as others and there was nothing discriminatory in 
a law which permits them to

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