LexL. V. JADHAV versus SHANKARRAO ABASAHEB PAWAR & OTHERS
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
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L. V. JADHAV
v.
SHANKARRAO ABASAHEB PAWAR & OTHERS
August 30, 1983
(S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, A. VARADARAJAN
AND M. P. THAKKAR, JJ.] .
·.
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961-·Sections 2 and 4 scope of-Demand for
payment of money made during marriage ceremonies-Demand pressed /ater-
Whethe~ Constitutes an offence under section 4.
High Court-ln~erent powe·r-W'hen should be exercised.
·In a con1plaint filed before the Judicial Magistrate the appellant (bride's
father) alleged that during the marriage ceremOnies the first respondent {bride-
groom's father) had demanded a large sum of money to be paid to him as
dowry and threatened that if the appellant did not pay the sum he would
atop further marriage ceremonies, that even after his daughter had gone to the
first respondent's house after the 1narriage the respondent's continued to
demand payment of money and that this constituted an offence under section 4
of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
After verifying the complaint the Judicial Magistrate issued processes to
the respondents and sent summons is to the United States where tht
respondents were.
Allowing the respondent's application impugning the order of the
Magistrate issuing summonses, the High Court held that since there was nO
allegation in the complaint that the respondents first demanded the dowry and
the appellant had agreed to pay it and the respondents th~reafter demanded it
again, no offence under sect!on 4 was made out.
In the appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant
that a mere demand for dowry, even if there was no consent to comply with
that demand, would constitute an offence under section 4 of the Act.
,. Allowing the appeal,
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HELD : From a reading of section 2 of the Act, it would appear that
consent to comply with demand for payment -of any property or valuable
securities as 'considerat!on' for the marriage would alone make the property
or \faluable security given or agreed to be given directly or indirectly ",dowry"
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L.v. JADHAV v. S.A. I'AWAR ("flaradarajan, J.)
763
within the meaning: of the Act. But having regard to the dominant purpose of
· the Act the entries definition of ''dowry" should not be imported into section 4.
The dictionary meaning of the word 'bride' is a woman about to marry or has
just been married and a 'bridegroom; is a man who is about to rilarry or has
just been married. If the literal n1eaning of these· words is given to the words
bride and bridegroom used in the section any property or valuable 5ecurity
demanded and consented to be given before the woman had become a bride
or the man had become a bridegroom may not be dowry. The avowed object
of the Act being to eradicate the evil Of demanding dowry, a liberal construc-
tion has to be given to the word "dowry'' to mean any property or v~luabl•
iiCCurity which if consented to be given on demand would· be dowry within the
meaning of section 2. There . is, therefore, no warrant for· the re,spondents'
contention that initial demand for dowry would not constitute an offence but
that it would be an offence only when the demand was made again after the,
party on whom it was made bad agreed to comply with it. [771 B·H; 722 A]
lndt:'r Sain and Another v. The State, 1981 Ctl. L.J. 1116 approved.
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The inherent power of the High Court must be exercisid sparingly and
,with circumspection when there is reason to believe that the process of law is
being misused to harass a citizen. In this cas~ the High Court should hav1
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rcfuied to invoke its inherent power at the threshold to quash the proceedings.
[772 B-C]
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JLTR!SD!CTION : Criminal Appea[ No. 494
of 1982.
Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated
the 22nd December, 1981 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal
Appln. No. 283 of 19_81.
Y. S. Chitale, V. N. Ganpule, Sirish Gupta and Mrs. V.D. Khanna
for the Appellant.
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V. S. Desai and G. B. Sathe for the Respondent.
P. G. Gokhale and M. N. Shroff for the State of Maharashtra.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
VARAD.~RAJAN, J. This appeal
by special
leave is· -directed
8.gainst the judgment 9f a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court
in Criminal Application No. 283 of 1981, quashing the proceedings
·in Criminal Case No. 1634 of 1980 on the file of the Judicial Magis-
trate, First Class (Anti Corruption), Pune. The application in the
fli~h <?ourt was filed by the respondenExcerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.