KUNJ BEHARILAL AGARWAL versus UNION OF INDIA
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS KUNJ BEHARILAL AGARWAL v. UNION OF INDIA (B. P. SINHA, c. J., K. SUBBA RAO, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, J. R. MunnoLKAR and T. L. VENKATARAMA AfYAR, JJ.) Defena Service-Temporary Clerks and Extra Temporary Clerks-Fixation of seniority-Constitutionality of order-Con- stitution of India, Arts. 14, 16(1), 32. The petitioner was employed by the Ministry of Defence in 1942 as an Extra Temporary Establishment Clerk. As a i-esult of certain orders of the Government, there was an amalgamation of the services known as non-industrial staff in the Extra Temporary Establishment with those in another parallel service known as the Temporary Establish- ment. The petitioner "contended in the petition that while Extra Temporary Clerks and the Tempora1y Clerks possessed the same qualifications, grade for grade, discharged the same duties and were governed by subtantially similar service con- ditions, under the order of the Government dated April 201 1955, a Temporary Clerk was given the right to have his seniority based on the length of his actual service, but the case of Extra Temporary Clerks like the petitioner, though in service since 1942, the entire service was not taken into account in fixing the seniority in the amalgamated roll and only half the period between 1942 and 1949 was taken into consideration. The petitioner contended that persons who entered service long after him as Temporary Clerks had been given places .of seniority above him. _The result was that they became entitled to be promoted to h1gh~r grades much earlier than the petitioner. That applied not only to the petitioner but also to the entire class of Extra Temporary Clerks. The petitioner contended that there was no valid or reason- able basis for the discriminatory treatment of one set of employees as against another. The order was violative of the equal protection guaranteed by Art. 14 and the guarantee of equal op~rt?nity for empI?rment guaranteed by Art. 16(1) ,} 1 of the Const1tut1on. The pet1t1oner challenged the constituti- onal validity '!f the ord~r da~ed.April 20, 1955, and prayed for a dcclarahon that hlS semonty be computed without reference to the said order .• 1 . 1962 April II. IPOJ Kuni B•huila1 Ayat'wol •• Unim of !Mia 2 SUPREME COURT &EPOR'l'S C1963) Held, that the two services had no common origin, but were recruited on different bases on different rates of pay and runditions of service. Even among tbe members of the two parallel services, there had been great disparities in rates of pay and condition of•ervice. The two ScrvicC9 had been unified within each group by separate order• passed in 1945 and 1946. As a rernlt of the changes brought about by these two orders in these two groups, a substantial amount of uniformity in the conditions of service of each group, comp- ared with the other, had also been achieved. An attempt had been made to bring into a common roll the member• of the two Services by the communication dated Augu•t 14, 1946, but that communication was cancelled on February 15, 1947, Before August 19, 1949, the Temporary Clerks held their employment a. against sanctioned p<>919. The Extra Temp· orary Clerks were ad hoc employees recruited on a temporary basis and not against any sanctioned post, whether permanent or temporary. On the date of the amalgamation when the services of the Extra Temporary Clerks were regularised and they were brought to a. common establishment, the position wa. that when:aJ the Temporary Clerks along with the per· manent establishment were members of the ISP or IPE, the Extra Temporary Clerk's did not fall within that category, and were made part 0£ it only from and after August 1, 1949, ol'nder the order dated August 19, 1949. While the Tempor· ary Clerks could claim to have been in the same •ervice from even before August 1, 1949, the Extra Temporary Clerk• cou Id claim to belong to that service only from and after August 1, 1949. There was no express provision providin~ for a common basis of seniority based on length of service of the personnel falling under two groups and there WaJ no intention of providing a common rule for determining the •eniority. The petitioner could not claim that any rights regarding seniority which he posse.•ed on the date when the Constitution came into force, were, in any way, restricted or denied to him by the order of April 20, 1955. The said order was reall
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