LexKUMBHAR DHIRAJLAL MOHANLAL versus STATE OF GUJARAT
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- KUMBHAR DHIRAJLAL MOHANLAL A v. STATE OF GUJARAT OCTOBER 4, 1996 [M.K. MUKHERJEE AND S.P. KURDUKAR, JJ.] B Penal Code, 1860-Sectiolt 302--- Uxoricide---Accused--Husband, set- ting his wife on fire-Acquittal by Trial Court-Reversal of acquittal order and conviction by High Court-Dying declaration by deceased before Doctor and Executive Magistrate, found reliable and made in conscious and fit state of C mind-Door of the house was closed even after deceased was burnt-Negates the story of accidental death-Appellant sustained injuries while extinguishing the fire, does not lead to the inference that fire was accidental-Conviction upheld. Evidence Act, 1872---Section 32-:Dying declaration-Before Doctor D and the Executive Magistrate-Medical Certificate that at the material time the deceased was in conscious and fit state of mind, also supported by other evidence on record-Held, Dying declaration reliable. Appellant married the deceased three months prior to her death and E only a week before her death they had starfild_ living separately. The appellant for paying the rent, sold kandora (waist-band) of the deceased and on this account a quarrel ensued between them. In the course of the quarrel the appellant first started beating her and thereafter he poured kerosene oil and set her on fire. On seeing the blaze the appellant tried to extinguish the fire and got some burn injuries. PW-6 brought them to the F Ho~pital where they were examined by PW-2, a Doctor who found that the deceased had sustained 65% burns. PW-2 on the statement made to him by the deceased, informed the City Police Station that the deceased was burnt by her husband by pouring kerosene and he also had received some burn injuries. The Head Constable arrived and recorded the statement of G the deceased and thereafter, PW-3, Executive Magistrate after taking the opinion of Doctor that she was conscious and fit to make statement, recorded her statement. Consequent to the death of the deceased a chargesheet under section 302 'IPC was filed against the appellant. In the absence of the eye-witness H 177 178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 7 S.C.R. A the prosecution rested its case upon three dying-declarations of the deceased; made before the Head Constable, Doctor and the Executive Magistrate. But the appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges and contended that the deceased accidentally caught fire from the u<en, while preparing breakfast. B The trial court, on considering the evidence, relied upon the defence story and acquitted the accused on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond re.asonable doubt. The High Court on re-appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence C reversed the order of acquittal on the ground that the trial court failed to appreciate the reliability of the dying-declarations made by the deceased and convicted the appellant for uxoricide. Hence, this appeal. Dismissing the appeal, this court D HELD : 1. Immediately after the deceased was admitted in hospital, she narrated to the doctor, PW-2 that her husband poured kerosene upon her and set her on fire. The statement recorded by the Executive Magistrate was recorded after taking the certificate from the Doctor that the deceased was conscious and in a fit state to make statement. The other evidence and E the cross-examination on record also support that at the material time the deceased was in a fit state of mind and had V!iluntarily made the statement on the basis of her personal knowledge without being influenced by others. Hence, there was no discrepancy whatsoever in the dying-declaration made before the Doctor and the Executive Magistrate. The Trial Court was not justified in discrediting the dying-declarations. [183-A; C-D] F 2. The dying-declarations clearly indicate that it was only after the deceased was put on fire the appellant sustained the burn injuries. In the dying declaration made before the Executive Magistrate the deceased had stated that since the quilt was put upon her by her husband, she could not G shout. It was not unlikely that while putting the quilt the appellant might have sustained burn injuries. It was also stated that after she was burnt, the door of the house was closed and so she could not go out. It clearly negates the theory of accidental death and on the other hand indicates that the appellant wanted to cause her death by burning. Even if it was assumed
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