KUMARI SHRILEKHA VIDYARTHI ETC. ETC versus STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.

Citation: [1990] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 625 · Decided: 20-09-1990 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: J.S. VERMA · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

KUMAR! SHRILEKHA VtDY ARTHI ETC. ETC, 
v. 
STATE OF U.P. AND ORS. 
SEPTEMBER 20, 1990 
[J.S. VERMA AND R.M. SAHA!, jJ.) 
Constitution of India, 1950: Article 14-Requirement of fairness 
in State action-Arbitrariness very negation of rule of law-Contractual 
obligation cannot divest state of fairness in its action. 
A 
·a 
The writ petitioners/appellants had been appointed as Govern• C 
ment Counsel (Civii, Criminal, Revenue) by the State of U.P. By its 
circular dated 6.2.1990 the State terminated the appointment of ail 
Government Counsel with effect from 28.2.1990 irrespective of the fad 
whether the term of the incumbent had expired or Was subsisting. At 
the s~me time the Government directed preparation of fresh panels to 
make appointments in place of existing incumbents. The appellants b 
chaiienged the validity of this· State action, which Was rejected by the 
High Court. 
Before this Court it was contended inter alia on behalf of the 
petitioners/appellants that the relationship of the Government Counsel 
with the Government was not mereJy one of client and counsei as in the 
E 
case of a private client, but one of status in the nature of public employ• 
ment or appointment to a 'public office' so that termination of the 
appointment of a Government Counsel couid not be equated with the 
termination by a private litigant of his Counsel's engagement, which 
was purely contractual, without any public element attaching to it. 
, 
F 
On behaif of the State it was urged that: (i) the relationship of the 
appointees to these offices of Government Counsel in the districts was 
purely contractual dependin,ll on the terms of the contract and was in 
the nature of an engagement of a Counsel by a private party who could 
be changed at any time at the will of the litigant, with there being no 
right in the counsel to insist on continuance of the engagement; (ii) there 
d 
was. no element of public employment in such appointments and the 
provisions in the Legal Remembrancer's Manual and Section 24 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure were merely to provide for making a suit• 
able choice; (iii) the appointment of a District Government Counsel was 
only professional engagement terminable at will on ~ither side and not 
appointment to a post under the Government; and the Governm·eni had 
H 
625 
626 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1990] Supp. I S.C.R. 
A 
the power to terminate the appointment at any time 'without assigning 
any cause' and hence this circular did not suffer from the vice of 
arbitrariness. 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
Allowing the writ petitions and the appeals, this Court, 
HELD: (I) The provisions in the Legal Remembrancer's Manual 
clearly show that the Government Counsel in the districts are treated as 
law Officers of the State who are holders of an 'office' or 'post'. These 
provisions further indicate that the appointment and engagement of 
District Government Counsel is not the same as that by a private liti-
gant of his counsel and there is obviously an element of continuity of the 
appointment unless the appointee is found to be unsuitable either by his 
own work, conduct or age or in comparison to any more s.uitable candi-
date available at the place of appointment. 
(2) All Government Counsel are paid remuneration out of the 
public exchequer and there is a clear public element attaching to the 
'office' or 'post'. 
(3) Clause 3 of para 7.06 of the L.R: Manual which enables the 
Government to terminate the appointment 'at any time without assign-
ing any cause' merely means that the termination may be made even 
during the subsistence of the term of appointment, and the expression 
'without assigning any cause' means without communicating any cause 
to the appointee whose appointment is tertitlnated. 
(4) The non-assigning of reasons or the non-communication 
thereof may be based on public policy, but termination of an appoint-
ment without the existence of any cogent reason in furtherance of the 
object for which the power is given would be arbitrary and, therefore, 
against public policy. 
Liberty Oil Mills v. Union of India, [1984] 3 SCC 465, referred 
to. 
(5) In the case of Public Prosecutors, the public element flowing 
from statutory provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure, undoub-
tedly, invest the Public Prosecutors with the attribute of holder of a 
public office 'which cannot be whittled down by the assertion that their' 
engagement is purely professional between a client and his lawyer with 
n

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