LexKUMAR ETC. ETC. versus KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL COOP. BANK LTD. & ANR.
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[2012] 9 S.C.R. 1117 KUMAR ETC. ETC. v. KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL COOP. BANK LTD. & ANR. (Criminal Appeal Nos. 2049-2066 of 2012) DECEMBER 14, 2012 [P. SATHASIVAM AND RANJAN GOGOi, JJ. ] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.397 rlw s.401 - Revisional Juiisdiction - Reversal of acquittal into conviction A B - Permissibility - Allegation that appellants pledged fake C ornaments and obtained loans thereagainst from respondent- bank - Acquittal of appellants by trial court - Revision petition - High Court allowed the same and convicted the appellants u/ss.406 and 420 rlw s.34 /PC - On appeal, held: While revisional power under the CrPC vest in the High Court the D jurisdiction to set aside an order of acquittal, the same would not extend to permit conviction of the accused - Thus, order of High Court converting the acquittal of appellants to one of conviction cannot be sustained in law - Further, the revision petition was inordinately delayed and no sufficient cause was E made out within the meaning of s. 5 of the Limitation Act - Evidence tendered by the prosecution witnesses also made it clear that the prosecution had failed to prove that the gold ornaments exhibited were the very same articles pledged by the appellants - Appellants accordingly entitled to acquittal - F Penal Code, 1860 - ss.406 and 420 rlw s.34 - Limitation Act, 1963 - s.5. Respondent no.1-Bank filed complaints alleging that the accused-appellants had obtained loans from it by pledging fake gold ornaments. The trial court acquitted G the appellants. Respondent no.1-Bank filed revision applications under Section 397 read with Section 401 CrPC . The High Court allowed the applications and 1117 H 1118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 9 S.C.R. A convicted the appellants under Sections 406 and 420 r/ w s.34 IPC, and therefore the present appeals. Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1. The revisional jurisdiction of a High Court B is conferred by the provisions of Section 397 read with Section 401 CrPC. While Section 397 empowers the High court to call for the record of any proceeding before any inferior criminal court within its jurisdiction to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, C sentence or order and such power extends to suspension of execution of any sentence or order and also to release the accused on bail, under Section 401 (3) CrPC there is an express bar in the High Courts to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. While D the revisional power under the CrPC would undoubtedly vest in the High Court the jurisdiction to set aside an order of acquittal the same would not extend to permit the conviction of the accused. The High Court may, however, order a retrial or a rehearing of the case, as may E be, if so justified. The order of the High Court converting the acquittal of the accused-appellants to one of conviction and the sentences imposed on each of them cannot be sustained in law. [Para 5) [1121-H; 1122-A-D] Sheetala Prasad & Ors. v. Sri Kant & Anr. 2010 (2) SCC · F 190: 2009 (16) SCR 686 and Johar & Ors. v. Mangat Prasad & Anr. 2008 (3) SCC 423: 2008 (2) SCR 185 - relied on. 2. Further, the Revision Applications filed by the complainant Bank before the High Court were G inordinately delayed, i.e., some by 290 days and the others by 785 days. An application was filed by the complainant Bank under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 seeking condonation of the delay in instituting the Revision Applications. The entire application is in a single H paragraph containing a bald statement that the result of KUMAR ETC. ETC. v. KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL 1119 COOP. BANK LTD. & ANR. the case (perhap~ the order of the trial court) was not A intimated to the bank and it is only after getting the requisite information and certified copies of the judgment that the Revision application could be filed. The High Court had condoned the delay on the ground that mere technicalities should not come in the way of rendering B justice. While there can be no dispute with the above proposition, one does not see how the same could have had any application to the present case. It was the duty of the High Court to consider the reasons assigned for the delay and thereafter come to the conclusion whether, c on the grounds shown, sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been made out. On the basis of the statem
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