KUMAON MOTOR OWNERS' UNION LTD. AND ANOTHER versus THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
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A KUMAON MOTOR OWNERS' UNION LTD. AND ANOTHER
B
c
D
F
G
H
v.
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
October 8, 1965
[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO,
M. HriJAYATULLAH, J.C. SHAH ANDS. M. SIKRI, JJ.]
Defence of India Rules, 1962 r. 131(2) (gg) ,and (1)-Powers under
Defence of India Act 1962 s. 43.
If prevails over s. 68 B of Motor
Vehicles Act read withs. 6(4) of Defence of India Act-If order passed
maJa fide to avoid payment of compensation.
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 s. 68B-Ch. IV A.
The reopondent-State issued a notification under r. 131 (2)(gg) and (i)
of the Defence of India Rules,. 1962 directing to stop plying of all vehicles
belonging to the members of the appellant-union on a roU!e in the border
region of the Country.
The appellants filed writ petitions in the High
Court, which were dismissed.
In appeal to this Court it was contended
that (i) the order was beyond the power of the State under r. 13 l ('.!) (gg)
and (i) of the Defence of India Rules;
(ii) on a combined reading of
s. 6( 4) of the Defence of India Act and s. 68B of the Motor Vehicles Act,
the provisions of Ch. IV-A of the Motor Vehicles Act with regard to the
framing of schemes and payment of compensation must be complied with
even where action is taken under r. 131 (2) (gg) and (i) of the Defence
of India Rules, and the action was mala fide; (iii) s. 44 of the Defence '
of India Act had been contravened by the order; and (iv) the satisfaction
necessary for passing the order under the Act and the Rules had not. been
shown by affidavits filed on behalf of the State and therefore the condi-
tion precedent to the passing of such an order was absent.
HELD: (i) The order passed by the State Government was clearly
wi'hin its powers under r. 131(2)(gg) and (i) of the Defence of India
Rules. [130 HJ
When cl. (gg) envisaged prohibition or restriction of carriage of
persons or goods by any vehicle or class of vehicles, it meant that the
order would apply to persons plying such vehicles. [127 A)
The impugned order was good so long it came within r. 131(2) (gg)
even though it may diminish the profit making capacity of a commercial
undertaking or even reduce it to nothing in a particular line of busi-
ness. [130 B-C]
Clause (i) of r. 131(2) was complementary to the other clauses of
r. 131(2). When the S'ate decided to issue a orohibition under cl. (gg),
it must naturally provide for alternative mechodo for the carriage of
persons or goods on the prohibited route and cl. (i) clearly makes provi-
sion for this. [130 D-E)
(ii) Section 43 of the Defence of India Act must prevail in the conflict
which appears to be apparent between s. 43 on one hand and s, 68B
of the Motor Vehicles Act read with s. 6(4) of the Defence of India Act
on the other. S. 43 appears in an Act which is later t?an Motor Vehicles
Act
and in such a situation unless there is anythmg repugnant. the
pro~isions in the later Act must prevail; looking at the object bc~!nd the
two statutes, the Act which was passed to meet an emergency ansmg out
122
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1966] 2 S.C.R.
of foreign invasion of the country must prevail over an Act meant to
A
meet a situation arising out of the taking over of motor transport by the
state; and s. 43 emphatically says that the Defence of India Act will
prevail over any other enactment and this suggests that the legislature
intended that the emergency legislation in the Defence of India Act will
be paramount if there is any inconsistency betwen it and any other provi-
sion of any o·hor law wha'soever. [128 A-G)
The argument that the entire Motor Vehicles Act must be read as a
II
part of the Defence of India Act must be rejected and in consequence
l), 43 of the Defence of India Acl will have over-riding effect. The \Vord-5
"shall have effect" in s. 6( 4) of the Defence of India Act, have to be
read in the context of that sub-section and in that context means !ha'
the Motor \r'ehic1e·s Act will continue a:s before subject to am.endn1ents
mad•o by s. 6( 4). [129 B-E]
There was no question of the order being mala fide or been passed as a
device to avoid payment of compensation under Ch. IV A. The fact that at
one stag·z nationalisation and consequent payment of compensation under
Ch. IV-A was under consideration docs not mean that if eventually action was
taken under s. 131(2) (gg) to stop acthities prejudicial to the defence of the
country such action wa• ma/a fide or was merely Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.
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