LexKULJIT SINGH ALIAS RANGA versus LT. GOVERNOR OF DELHI & ORS.
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
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KULJIT SINGH ALIAS RANGA
v.
LT. GOVERNOR OF DELHI & ORS.
January 20, 1982
(Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY AND
A.P. SEN, JJ.]
Clemency jurisdiction-Power of President to grant pardon etc. and to
suspend, remit or commute sentences in certain cases-Constitution of India, 19,01
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Article 72, scope of the power.
Dismissing the petition, the Court
HELD : I. Whatever be the guidelines observed for the exercise of the
power conferred by Article 72 of the Constitution, the only sentence which can
·J)ossibJy be imposed upon the petitioner i_n the instant case, is that of death and
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no circumstances exi~ for interference with that sentence. Not even the most
liberal use of his mercy jurisdiction could have persuaded the P~esident to inter-
fere with the sentence of death imposed upon the petitioner in view particularly·
ot the considerations mentioned in K.S. Rattga v. Union of India and Anr., [1981]
3 S.C R. 512. Therefore, in refusing to commute· the sentence the death imposed
upon the petitioner into a lesser sentence the President has not in any aiaoner
transgressed his discretionary power under Article 72. [59 D-E 1 60 B·C)
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2. Undoubtedly, the President has the power in aii appropriate case to
commute any sentence imposed by a Court into a lesser sentence. But the
question as to whether the case is appropriate for ithe exercise of the power con-
ferred by Article 72 depends upon the facts and circumstances of each parti ..
cular case. [59 E, CiJ.
3. After all the power conferred by Article 72 can be used only for the
purpose of reducing the sentence, not for enhancing tit. Therefore, no uaeful
purpose will be achieved by the petitioner by ensuring the imposition of any
seve1'e, judicially evolved constraints on the wholesome power of the President
to use it as the justice of a case may require. [59. H, 60 A]
James Shewan & Sons v. United States, 69 L. Ed. 527 at 535, referred to.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 8193A ,of
1981.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)
R. K. Garg, V. J. Frqncis, Suni/ Kumar Jain and D. K. Garg for
fh~ Petition~r-,,-Rang~,
'
.... .,.
1.
. '
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KUUIT SINGH v. LT. GOVERNOR (Chandrachud, c. J.)
59
R. K. Jain and P. K. Jain for the Petitioner-Billa.
N. C. Talukdar and R. N. Poddar for Respondent No. 1.
L. N. Sinha, Attorney General and Miss A. Subhashini for
Attorney General.
K. Parasaran, Solicitor General, M. K. Banerji, Additional
Solicitor General and Miss A. Subhashini for Union of India.
N. Nettar for the State of K~rnataka.
Raju Ramachandran
for
Applicant/intervener-Chhaganlal_
Aggarwal.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
CHANDRACHUD C. J.
The question as regards the scope of
the power of the President under article 72 of the Constitution to
commute a sentence of death into a lesser sentence may have to
await examination on an appropriate occasion. This clearly is not
that occasion because in so far as this case is concerned, whatever
be the guidelines observed for the exercise of the power conferred
by article 72, the only sentence which can possibly be imposed upon'
the petitioner is that of death and no circumstances exist for inter-
ference with that sentence. Therefore we see no justification for
saying that in refusing to commute the sentence of death imposed
upon tb,e petitioner into a lesser sentence, the President has in any
manner . transgressed his discretionary power under article 72.
Undoubtedly, the President has the power in an appropriate case to
commute any sentence imposed by a· .court into a lesser sentence
ayd as said by Chief Justice Taft in James Shewan & Sons v United
States('), the "executive clemency exists to afford relief from undue
harshness or evident mistake in the operation or enforcement of
the criminal law" and that the administration of justice by the
courts is not necessarily or certainly considerate of circumstances
which may properly mitigate guilt. But the question as to whether
the case is appropriate for the exercise of the power conferred by
Article 72 depends upon the facts and circumstances of each parti-
.c:ular case. The necessity or the justification for exercising that
power has therefore to be judged from ¢a~e to case. In fact, we do
not see what useful purpose will be 11i;qieved by tqe petitioner by
(I) 69 L Ed. 527 at 535.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1982) 3 S.Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.