KULDIP SINGH versus SUBHASH CHANDER JAIN AND ORS.

Citation: [2000] 2 S.C.R. 639 · Decided: 28-03-2000 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: AJAY PRAKASH MISRA · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 1 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

KULDIP SINGH 
A 
v. 
SUBHASH CHANDER JAIN AND ORS. 
MARCH 28, 2000 
[A.P. MISRA AND R.C. LAHOTI, JJ.] 
B 
Injunction-Suit for preventive injunction-To restrain defendant from 
operating a bhatti (baking oven) in· residential area-Trial Court granting 
relief-Appellate coun after carrying out local inspection dismissed suit 
holding that locality was not a purely residential one and operation of bhaJti 
C 
was not likely to cause any actionable nuisance-High Court restoring 
judgment and decree of trial court-Held, suit .filed by plaintiffs was prema-
ture-No preventive injunction could have been allowed to plaintiffs. 
Torts: Private nuisance-Future nuisance-Quia timet action-Suit for 
injunction against an apprehended injury likely to be cause by operation of a 
D 
bhatti (baking oven)-Bhatti not operational on date of filing of suit-Held, a 
mere possibility of injury will not pmvide plaintiff with a cause of action unless 
threat be so certain or imminent that an injury actionable in law will arise if' 
not prevented by an action-On facts, no case for quia ti met action made out-
Quia timet action-Explained. 
E 
Punjab Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 : 
S.342-Municipal Corporation-Grant of licence for operating a bhatti 
(baking oven)-Bhatti proposed to be nm in residential area-Suit filed seeking 
injunction to restrain the Corporal ion from granting licence-Held, grant o.f 
p 
licence is a statutory function to be discharge by Municipal Corporation-
Pending suit licence having already been issued to defen:dant, plaintiffs are at 
liberty to approach the CorporaJion and seek cancellation of licence by making 
out a case. 
Respondents No. 1 to 3 ·filed a suit for injunction against their neigh-
G 
hour (appellant/defendantN?· 1) restraining him from running/operating a 
bhatti (baking oven) as it was constructed and proposed to he run in 
residential area. They also prayed for a injunction against the Municipal 
Corporation restraining it from issuing the licence sought for by defendant 
No. 1. However, during pendency of the suit, licence was granted to defend-
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2000] 2 S.C.R. 
ant no. 1 under S. 342 of the Punjab Municipal Corporation Act, 1976. The 
trial court dismissed the suit against the Municipal Corporation, but de-
creed it against defendant No. 1 holding that the b/zatti was proposed to be 
run in a locality which was purely residential having been so earmarked in 
the town planning scheme and that the bhatti would result in emitting smell 
and generating heat and smoke which taken together would amount to 
nuisance. On an appeal filed by defendant No. 1, the Additional District 
Judge carried out a local inspection and dismissed the suit holding that the 
locality was not a purely residential one as other commercial activities were 
also being carried on there; and that operation of the bhatti was not likely to 
cause any such nuisance which could be termed actionable. The second 
appeal filed by the plaintiffs was allowed by the High Court. It upheld the 
view of the trial court, and restored the judgment and decree passed by it. 
Aggrieved, defendant No. 1 filed the present appeal. 
It was contended for the appellant that the action initiated by the 
plaintiffs was quia timet action; since they were seeking injunction against 
an apprehended injury likely to be caused by nuisance not it existence on 
the date of the suit, in the fact and circumstances of the case such an 
injunction could not have been granted. 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1.1. The suit filed by the plaintiffs was premature. No case 
for qui a timet action was made out. No relief much less by way of preventive 
injunction, could have been allowed to the plaintiffs. [646-G] 
1.2. A quia timet action is a bill in equity. It is an action preventive in 
nature and a specie of precautionary justice intended to prevent apprehended 
wrong or anticipated mischief and not to undo a wrong or mischief when it 
has already been done. In such an action the Court, if convinced, may inter-
fere by appointment of receiver or by directing security to be furnished or 
by issuing an injunction or any other remedial process. [ 644-G-H] 
Fletcher v. Bealey, 28 Ch.D. 698, referred to. 
1.3. A nuisance actually in existence stands on a different footing than 
a possibility of nuisance or a future nuisance. A mere possibility of injury 
will not provide the plaintiff with a cause of actio

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