KULDIP SINGH versus STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS

Citation: [1996] SUPP. 6 S.C.R. 339 · Decided: 16-09-1996 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: B.P. JEEVAN REDDY · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

• 
KULDIP SINGH 
A 
v. 
STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS 
SEPTEMBER 16, 1996 
[B.P. JEEVAN REDDY AND K.S. PARIPOORANAN, JJ.) 
B 
Service Law-Punjab Police Act 1861 : 
Punjab Police Rules, 1934-Section 7-Rules 16.1and16.24-Powerof 
dismissal and enquiry. 
C 
Constitution of India, 1950-Article 311(2)(b)(3)-Condition precedent 
to dispensing with the enquiry-Satisfaction of the disciplina1y authority 
recorded on proper assessment of facts and circumstances-The decision of 
the disciplinary authority is final but subject to judicial review-The decision D 
of the disciplinary authority, confinned by the appellate auth01ity not to hold 
enquiry against the appellant, helping the te"orists-High Court satisfied with 
the view-Supreme Court would not interfere and take a different view. 
Evidence Act, 187~Sections 25 and 26-Confessions made to the 
police officer-Relevancy in departmental enquiry-If accepted as voluntary E 
and tJUe by disciplinary authority and the appellate authority-Supreme Court 
would not go into the question-Strict rules of evidence not applicable to 
departmental enquiry-Principles of natural justice and rules governing the 
enquiry must be followed. 
F 
The Senior Superintendent of Police, invoking proviso(b) of Article 
311(2) of the Constitution and the Punjab Police Rule 16.1 read with 
Section 7 of the Punjab Police Act, 1861, dismissed the appellant, a Head 
Constable, who was helping the terrorists. The satisfaction of the Senior 
Superintendent of Police for not holding the enquiry was that the cir· 
cumstances were such that it was not reasonably practicable to hold an G 
enquiry against the appellant, as no witness was likely to depose against 
him due to fear of life. The appeal preferred by the appellant was rejected 
by the Inspector General of Police. The High Court also rejected his appeal 
holding that there were sufficient materials before the disciplinary 
authority for not holding the enquiry. The appellant moved this court H 
339 
340 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 6 S.C.R. 
A challenging that except the confession made to the police during interroga-
tion, there was no other material against him warranting his dismissal and 
that he was acquitted by the Designated Court. 
Dismissing the appeal, this Court 
B 
HELD : 1. Though according to sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence 
Act, the confession made before or while in custody of a police officer is 
not admissible, it is well-settled that these rules do not apply to 
departmental enquiry. Even the evidence recovered or discovered as a 
result of illegal search is relevant in India departing from the law of United 
C States. The fact that the confession was made to the police, may not be of 
much consequence for the reason that strict rules of evidence do not apply 
to the departmental enquiry and as such the appellant's confession is 
relevant. In departmental enquiry, it would perhaps be permissible for the 
authorities to prove that the appellant did make such a confession during 
the course of interrogation and it would be for the disciplinary authority 
D to decide whether it was voluntary or not. The disciplinary authority is 
entitled to act upon such statement if it is voluntary and true. Once the 
disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority conclude that the 
confession made by the appellant is voluntary, this court would not go into 
the question of its being voluntary or not. [345-H] 
E 
F 
2. Undoubtedly, there is no other material except the confesion of the 
appellant. There is also the fact that the appellant was acquitted by the 
designated court, however, the High Court has opined that there were 
en~ugh materials before the appropriate authority upon which it could 
come to a reasonable conclusion that it was not reasonable practicable to 
hold an enquiry as contemplated by clause (2) of Article 311 of the 
constitution. Nothing has been shown to justify the taking of a contrary 
view at this stage. Once proviso(b) of Article 311(2) is held to have been 
validly invoked, the only ground left with the concerned Govt. servant is 
to impugn the punishment actually awarded as being unwarranted. In the 
G instant case, the punishment awarded to the appellant cannot be said to 
be excessive. [346-B-E] 
KuTUma v. The Queen, (1955) A.C. 197, referred to. 
Union of India v. Tulsi Ram Patel, [1985) Suppl. 2 SCR 131; Pooran 
H Mal v. Director of Insvection, [1974) 1 SCC 345; State of Mysore v. S.S. 
KULDIP SINGH

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