KULDEEP SINGH versus COMMISSIONER OF POLICE AND ORS.
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A KULDEEP SINGH v. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE AND ORS. DECEMBER 17,1998 B [S. SAGHIR AHMAD AND S.P. KURDUKAR, JJ.] Service Law: Delhi Police (F & A) Rules 1980-Rule I6(3)- Natural Justice- C Domestic Enquiry-Termination of service-Non-production of witnesses, and Β·their previous statements brought on record by Enquiry Officer, whether justified-Held the factors enumerated in the rule constitute a condition-- precedent for the exercise of jurisdiction for this purpose-Held farther, the rule to be considered in the light of Article 3 I I (2) to provide reasonable D opportunity of hearing to the delinquent-In the facts of the case, held, the enquiry affected by bias, and wholly perverse-Evidence Act I872, Sections 32 and 33. Constitution of India-Articles 226 and 32-Domestic Enquiry - Interference with findings of-Held, normally High Court and Supreme Court E would not interfere with, nor sit in appeal over, findings recorded at the enqui0~-However, where findings perverse or based on no evidence or made at dictate of superior authority, Court may interj Pre. The appellant, a Constable in the Delhi Police, was dismissed from service in 1991 after a departmental enquiry found him guilty of having F taken Rs 200 out of Rs 1000 that he allegedly recovered from a factory owner to pay as wages to three labourers-complainants on 22.2.90. The order of dismissal was upheld in appeal before the Additional Commissioner of Police. On 28.2.97, the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) upheld the dismissal. A writ petition to the High Court was dismissed since the judgment of the CAT was passed before the date of decision of the Supreme Court in G L. Chandrakumar v. Union of India AIR 1997 SC ll25. A Review Application against the judgment of the CAT was also dismissed. In appeal before this Court, it was contended for the appellant that the disciplinary enquiry had been violative of natural justice. It was urged that the findings were perverse as no reasonable person could have come to these II 594 KULDEEP SINGH v. COMMR. OF POLICE 595 findings on the basis of evidence brought on record. A It was argued for the Union of India that the appellant had been given full opportunity during the enquiry. While none of the complainants-labourers had been examined for the department, it was contended that under Rule 16(3) of the Delhi Police (F & A) Rules 1980, it was not required where the witness cannot be produced without undue delay, inconvenience or expense, B and his statement made earlier could be placed on record. Further, the scope of judicial review is very narrow and limited, and the Court cannot reappraise evidence and substitute its own conclusion in place of the conclusion of the Enquiry Officer or the disciplinary authority. Allowing the appeal, this Court HELD: 1. The power of judicial review available with the High Court and this Court under the Constitution takes in its stride the domestic c enquiry as well. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding D of "guilt" is based on No evidence, or if the findings recorded are such as could not have been reached by an ordinary prudent man or the findings were perverse or made at the dictate of the superior authority, it can interfere with the conclusions reached therein. [599-C-D; 600-C-D) State of A.P. v. Sree Rama Rao, (1964) 3 SCR 25; Central Bank of India E v. Prakash Chand Jain, (1969) 2 LLJ 377 (SC) Bharat Iron Works v. Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel, (1976)2 SCR 280 and Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Administration through Secretary, (Labour) (1985) 1 SCR 866, relied on. 2. The charge against the appellant consisted of two components, F namely: (a) On 22.2.90 the factory owner paid Rs 1000 to the appellant for being paid to the three labourers. (b)Appellant paid Rs 800 to labourers and kept Rs 200 with himself. G The factory owner, appearing as a witness, however, denied having made any payment to the appellant on that day. She stated in clear terms that she had not made any payment to the appellant, but had asked the three labourers to come after a few days and it was then that the whole amount which was due from her was paid to them. (602-B-C; H; 603-A) H 596 SUPREME COURT R!cPORTS f 1 '198] SUPP. 3 <;.C.R. A 3. The labourers to whom the payment was said to have been made were not produced at the domestic enquiry. N
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