KRISHNAPPA versus STATE OF KARNATAKA

Citation: [2004] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 894 · Decided: 25-08-2004 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: Y.K. SABHARWAL, D.M. DHARMADHIKARI · Disposal: Leave Granted & Allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
KRISHNAPPA 
v. 
STATE OF KARNATAKA 
AUGUST 25, 2004 
[Y.K. SABHARWAL AND D.M. DHARMADHIKARI, JJ.] 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: 
S. 319-Summoning of other persons as accused-Appellant along 
with others arrayed as accused-Proceedings against him quashed u/s. 
482-Afler conclusion of prosecution evidence State filing application 
u!s. 319 for summoning the appellant-Trial court rejecting the application--
High Court setting aside order of trial court and directing trial of 
appellant-Held, for exercise of discretion all relevant factors have to be 
kept in view and an order is not required to be made mechanically merely 
on the ground that some evidence has come on record implicating the 
person sought to be added as an accused-,-On facts, exercise of discretion 
by trial court did not call for interference by High Court-Order of High 
Court set aside. 
Michael Machado & Anr. v. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr., 
(2000) 3 sec 262, r!!lied on. 
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi & Ors., 
F (1983) I sec I, referred to. 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 
934 of 2004. 
G 
From the Judgment and Order dated 27.2.2004 of the Kamataka High 
Court in Crl. R.P. No. 554 of 2000. 
Prakash Shrivastava for the Appellant. 
H 
Sanjay R. Hegde for the Respondent. 
894 
KRISHNAPPA v. STATE 
895 
{ 
The following Order of the Court was delivered : 
A 
Leave granted. 
This appeal is directed against the impugned judgment of the High 
Court passed in revisional jurisdiction whereby the order dated 5th 
February, 2000 passed by the trial Magistrate dismissing the application B 
' 
of the State filed under Section 319 Cr. P.C. has been set aside. By the 
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impugned judgment the appellant has been arrayed as an accused to be tried 
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with twelve other accused. 
The case before the Magistrate relates to an incident of the year 1993 c 
which led to certain simple injuries and damage to some crops. Twelve 
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accused are facing trial. The appellant was also arrayed as one of the 
accused but the High Court had quashed the case against him in the year 
1995 on a petition filed by him under Section 482 Cr. P .C. 
l 
The State filed an application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. before the D 
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Magistrate for summoning the appellant as an accused after the conclusion 
of prosecution evidence examining 17 prosecution witnesses and recording 
of the statements of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. by the trial 
Magistrate. The learned Magistrate by a detailed order, after examination 
of the evidence, dismissed the application, inter alia, of noticing that on E 
evidence, the possibilities of the appellant being convicted were remote. 
The trial court also noticed the factum of the quashing of the proceedings 
against the appellant in the year 1995. 
i 
The High Court, in the impugned judgment has come to the conclusion 
I 
that some of the prosecution witnesses have deposed about the presence F 
of the appellant on the date of the incident and also about the instigation 
made by him to the other accused persons to destroy the crops and tree 
grown by PW-I. 
It has been repeatedly held that the power to summon an accused is G 
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an extraordinary power conferred on the court and should be used very 
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sparingly and only if compelling reasons exist for taking cognizance 
against the other person against whom action has not been taken. 
:\ 
In the present case, we need not go into the question whether prima 
facie the evidence implicates the appellant or not and whether the H 
896 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 
A possibility of his conviction is remote, or his presence and instigation stood 
established, for in our view the exercise of discretion by the Magistrate, 
in any event of the matter, did not call for interference by the High Court, 
having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. 
B 
Mr. Sanjay Hegde, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/ 
State, contends, relying upon the decision of this Court in Municipal 
Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi & Ors., (1983] 1 SCC 2, that 
the trial court had the power to summon the appellant in exercise of power 
under Section 319 Cr.P.C. even when the proceedings had been earlier 
quashed qua him and the trial court committed serious illegality in 
C observing to the contrary and thus the High Court rightly reversed the order 
of the Magistrate. Though an order under Section 319 Cr.P.C. summoning 
a 

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