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KRISHNA MURARI AGGARWALA versus THE UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

Citation: [1976] 1 S.C.R. 16 · Decided: 15-07-1975 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: N.L. UNTWALIA · Disposal: Case Allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

16 
KRISHNA MURARI AGGARWALA 
v. 
THE UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 
July 15, 1975 
[N. L. UNTWALIA AND S. M. FAZAL ALI, JJ.] 
Mailuenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, 
Section 
3(1),(a)(iiiJ-Two 
grounds of detention-One irrelevant-Effect of-Detaining Authority, more 
than one-Prdpriety. 
The petftioner was carrying on business in diesel oil, an essential commo-
dity, in two places. He was detained under s. 3(1){a)(iii) of the Maintenance 
of Internal Security Act, 1971, on the basis of allegations in lWo grounds that 
as had committed sets prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services 
'l!ssentlal to the communitΒ₯. 
The allegation in' the first ground was that he 
had stocked a large quantity of light dioesel oil in one of the places without 
waiting for the licence to be cleared by the Chief Controller of Explosives in 
violation of the provisions of the Petroleum Act. 
It was also stated in the 
ground that a complaint had be-en lodged in the ~lagistrate's court for the 
offence. 
The allegation in the second ground was that the petitioner violated 
the U.P. Sale of Motor Taxation Act and the rules made thereunder, in that 
the names and addresses of customers who had purchased light diesel from 
the petitioner, had not been given in the cash memos. 
Allowing the petition, 
HELD: (l)(a) There is no allegation by the detaining authority in the 
first ground that by storing the huge quantity of light diesel oil the petitioner 
had in any way affected the distribution or sale of that commodity; nor is 
there any allegation to show that th-e petitioner had refused to sell the oil to 
anybody who required it. 
Also there is no suggestion, far less any allegation, 
that the petitioner had tried to divert his stocks from one place to the other 
and thereby deprived the people of one place of their share of the oil. There-
fore, there i's ab,!iolutely no correlation between the act of the petitioner and 
the disruption of distribution of essential supplies to the community. {20D-E, F-G] 
(b) Fron1 the violation of the mandatory provisions of the Petroleum Act and 
the Rules made thereunder, no presumption can be drawn that there was a 
disruption of supply of the e~scntial commodity. 
[20G-H1 
(c) The commission of an offence at a private place or a violation of a pro-
vision of law by itself docs not attract the Maintenance of Internal Security Act 
unless, by the act committed, the supply oi' an essential commodity to the com-
munity is disrupted or the even flow of the life of the community is disruoted. 
[21B] 
Manu Bhusha11 Roy Prodha11 v. State of Bent;oi' and Otl1ers, ,A.. l. R. 1973 
S. C. 29'5, referred to. 
(2) The second ground does di.sdose a clear .overt act from which an in-
ference can be drawn that the petitioner had made a number of fictitious sales. 
But, in view of the finding that the first ground is irrelevant, it is not possible 
to determine to what extent the subjectivie satisfaction of the detaining authority 
was influenced or affected by the first ground. 
When out of 2 grounds one is 
vague or irrelevan't, then the entire order of detention falls to 
the 
ground. 
[22C, F-Gl 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
(3) The Court cannot go behind the subjective satisfaction of the detaining 
authority but such satisfaction does not confer a blanket power which may 
authorise the detaining ttuthority to act in a ruthless or arbitrary fashion._ J udL 
H 
cial decisions have carved out an area. though limited, within which, the sub-
jective satisfaction of the detaining authority, which is a si~e qu_a non for the 
exercise of the power, can be tested on the touchstone of ob1ect1vity. 
[24F-GJ 
β€’ 
β€’ 
i 
\ 
. ' 
A 
K. M. AGGARWALA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 
17 
(a) Tile words '"mile an order directing that such person be detained" in 
ieetion 3 ( 1) of the Act postulates three conditions : (i) that the order must 
be made by the authority in the section; (ii) The order must be duly signed by 
the 11aid authority; and (iii) that only one authority and one authority alone caa 
pass the order of detention. Therei'ore, unless the order made and the ground.:f 
prepared are signed by the authority concerned, the order is not made as con ... 
templated by the section.-
{25F-G] 
. 
. 
ll 
(b) Further. since the order is based on grounds to be served on the detenu, 
c 
D 
E 
the order of detention could be passed only if the grounds are in existence and 
are prepared contemporaneously, otherwise the order of detention beco

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