KRISHNA BIHARILAL versus GULABCHAND AND ORS.

Citation: [1971] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 27 · Decided: 16-03-1971 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K.S. HEGDE · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

KRISHNA BIHARILAL 
v. 
GULABCHAND AND ORS. 
March 16, 1971 
[K. S. HEGDB AND P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, JJ.] 
Hindu Law-Widow entitled to life estate-Entering into compro1nise 
with reversioners giving up rights over portion of property in return for 
recognition of her absolute ownership of pat·t of property-Revt!rsioners 
are estopped from challenging alienations by widow of properties recog-
nised as absolutely hers in compromise-'Malik Mustakal' means absolute 
estate-Document must be read to give efJect to plain and natural mean-
ing to words employed-Plea of .stoppel when may be considered though 
not specifically raised in pleadings. 
B filed a suit for the possession of ancestral property against the 
descendants of his father's brother and &ister. D.uring the pendency of the 
suit B died and bis widow P was impleaded as his legal representative. 
Some of the defendants also died; those who left legal representatives were 
substituted by them. On June 7. 1941 the parties to the suit compromised 
their disputes. Before compromisin& the suit the parties had obtained the 
leave of the court as the minor defendants had joined the compromise. 
Under the compromise a portion of the suit properties was aiven to P 
and the remaining portion to the defendants in that suit. P alienated the 
properties given to her under three different sale deeds. 
The appellant 
was the alienee under all these sale deeds. The alienations were challeng-
ed by the defendants in the earlier suit and their descendants in three suits 
wherein declarations were sought that the aforesaid alienations by P were 
not valid and binding on the plaintiffs who were the _presumptive rever-
sioners to the estate of B. During the pendency of the -Suits P died and 
thereafter the suits were contested only by the appellant as the alience. The 
trial court dismissed two of the suits holding that in view of the compro-
mise in the earlier suit the parties were cstopped from challenging the vali-
dity of the sale deeds as under that compromise the estate given to P wa-s an 
absolute one. After ·various stages of litigation the Division Bench of the 
High Court held that the compromise of 1941 was illegal and as such could 
not be used to non-suit the plain.tiffs. It also, held that the compro111ise did 
not ameunt to a family arrangement. 
HELD : (i) The ordinary rule of construction of a document is to 
give effect to the normal and natural meaning of the words employed in 
the document. The compromise deed specifically said that the properties 
given to P were to be enjoyed by her as 'Malik Mustakal'. These words 
have been interpreted to mean an absolute estate. The circumstances in 
which the compromise was entered into as welt as the languaae used in 
the deed did not in any manner go to indicate that the estate given to P 
was anything other than an absolute estate. [31E-F] 
Dhyan Singh and Anr. v. /uga/ Kislwre & Anr .• (1952] S.C.R. 478 and 
Bishunath Prasad Singh v. Chandika Prasad Kumar, 60 I.A. 56, relied on. 
(ii) In holding that the compromise in question was illegal the Divi-
sion Bench overlooked the fact that this was not a compromise entered 
into fWith third parties. It was a compromise entered into with presumptive 
revefsioners. Further, since at no stage had the plaintiffs pleaded that the 
compromise was illegal. the High Court was not justified in going into 
the validity of the compromise. [31H-32B] 
27 
A 
c 
E 
G 
R 
28 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1971] SUPP. s.c.R. 
(iii) Even if the compromise was illegal the parties to the compro1nise-
were cstopped from challenging the impugned alienation. 
It is well settled that a Hindu widow cannot enlarge her estate by 
entering into a compromise with third parties to the prejudice of the ulti-
mate reversioners. 
But the same will not be true if the compromise is 
entered into with persons who ultimately become the reversioners. P was 
entitled to enjoy the entire properties included in the earlier suit during 
her life time; but under the compromise a fraction of those properties 
was given to her absolutely. She gave up her rights in a substantial por-
tion of the properties on the representation of the defendants that she 
could take a portion of the suit properties absolutely. This was a repre-
sentation of fact and not law. 
[32B-33AJ 
T.V.R. Subbu Chetty's Family Charities v. M. Raghava 
Mudily<1r 
and ors., [1961] 3 S.C.R. 624, relied on. 
When the nearest presumptiv

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