KISHANCHAND NARSINGHDAS BHATIA versus STATE TRANSPORT APPELLATE AUTHORITY & ORS.
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A B KISHANCHAND NARSINGHDAS BHATIA v. STATE TRANSPORT APPELLA1E AUTIIORITY & ORS. March 28, 1968 [M. HlDAYATULLAH C.J., R. S. BACHAWAT, C. A. VAIDIALJNGAM, K. S. HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.] Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 13&- Decision on question of fact by State Transport Authorities-Interference by Supreme Court in appeal by special leave. The Regional Transport Authority renewed a stage carriage permit in C favour of the appellant. The State Transport Appellate Authority set aside the order in apl""'I, and granted the permit to the 3rd respondent. One of the considerallons that prevailed with the Appellate Authority was that the 3rd :respondent bad offered to put into service an air cooled 1965-model vehicle. The order of the Appellate Authority was confirmed by the High Court in a writ petition. In appeal to this Court under Art. 136, it was contended that after the renewal of the permit in his favour by the R.T.A. the appellant ac- D quired a 1966-i11odel bus whicli would have been equally serviceable; but this fact of acquisition of a new bus was not relied upon by the appellant before the Appellate Authority. It was also contended that the appellant was entitled to preference in the matter of renewal on the facts establish· ed in the present case. HELD : This Court would be reluctant to interfere with or disturb the decision of specially constituted authorities or tribunals under the E Motor Vehicles Act, especially when the legislature has · entrusted the task of granting cir renewing the stage carriage permits to such authorities which are expected to be fully conversant with the procedure and prac- tice and the matters relevant under the provisions of the Act. This Court will not decide a matter brought before it by special leave, under Art. 136, as if it we're an appellate court. It will not examine or review find- ings of fact unless it can be shown that they are perverse or shocking to the judicial conscience. Tho power being of an exceptional and over· F riding nature has to be exercised sparingly and with caution and only in special and extraordinary situations when justice so requires. [608 F·H; 609 A-BJ. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 740 of 19~. . Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated G December 19, 1967 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petition No. 225 of 1967. H M. C. Chagla, G. L. Sanghi and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the appellant. S. V. Gupte and S. K. Gambhir, for respondeD,t No. 3. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Grover, J.. This appeal by special leave is from the judg- ment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dismissing a petition filed under Arts. 226 & 227 of the Constitution challenging an I 606 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1968] 3 S.C. R. order made by the State Transport Appellate Authority in res· A pect of a stage carriage permit for the route, Digthan· Indore via Ghata Billod. The appellant had· applied for renewal of his stage carriage permit for that route. Respondent No. 3 and another person of the name of Balwantrao Gaikwad and the Madhya Pradesh Road Transport Corporation filed applications for grant of a fresh permit for the same route. As the application of Balwantrao Gaikwad was not ripe for hearing and the Corporation withdrew its appli· cation, the Regional Transport Authority considered the rival claims of !)le appellant and respondent No. 3. The latter made an offer at the hearing that he would run an air-cooled 1965 model vehicle. The Transport Authority, however, took the view that the offer had been made by way of a competitive bid. In its opinion both the applicants were at par in the matter of coverage and adverse remarks, but the appellant was superior in experience and provision of facilities for passengers. The permit of the ap· pellant was renewed for·a period of three years from the date of its expiry on (he existing terms. Respondent No. 3 preferred an appeal under s. 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 193 9 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) which was disposed of by the State Trans· port Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority gave weight to the fact that whereas respondent No. 3 had offered to run an air-cooled vehicle of 196;> mooel, 110 such offer had been made by the appellant who was operating the route with a vehicle of 1957 mooel. It further found that the appellant had not been running the bus on the kachha portion
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