LexKISAN SHANKAR KATHORE versus ARUN DATTATRAY SAWANT & ORS
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A B [2014] 7 S.C.R. 258 KISAN SHANKAR KATHORE v. ARUN DATIATRAY SAWANT & ORS (Civil Appeal No. 4261 of 2007) MAY 09, 2014 [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR AND A.K. SIKRI, JJ.] Representation of People Act, 1951 - s. 100(1)(d)(i) and (iv) - Non-disclosure of information - Election petition by voter C - Improper acceptance of returned candidate's nomination by returning officer, despite suppression of material facts, thus, election void - High Court set aside the election of returned candidate - On appeal, held: Non-disclosure of the electricity dues not a serious lapse, but non-disclosure of property and D vehicle in the name of returned candidate's wife as also returned candidate's interest/share in the partnership firm major lapse - Thus, material information about the assets not disclosed in the affidavits given by the returned candidate along with the nomination form - There was not a substantial E compliance in disclosing the requisite information in the affidavits along with the nomination paper - Once it is found that it was a case of improper acceptance, as there was misinformation or suppression of material information, the rejection can only be at a later date and appropriate stage F would be in an election petition - When the court gives such a finding which results in rejection, effect would be that such candidate was not entitled to contest and the election is void, otherwise, it would be an anomalous situation, which cannot be countenanced - Thus, the order passed by High Court is G upheld. The appellant was declared successful candidate in I the election of legislative assembly. The first respondent-/' voter, filed an election petition uls. 100(1 )(d)(i) and (iv) of the Representation of People Act, 1951 stating that the H 258 KISAN SHANKAR KATHORE v. ARUN DATTATRAY 259 SA WANT appellant's nomination was improperly accepted by the A returning ,officer and the election was void due to non- compliance of the provisions of the Constitution and the Representation of People Act, 1951. The first respondent contended that the appellant had suppressed his dues payable to the Government; the assets in the name of B spouse and outstanding taxes thereof; the vehicle owned by the spouse; and the property purchased in the name of the firm of which he is the partner. The High Court set aside the election of the appellant holding that the nomination form of the appellant was defective and c should not have been accepted by the returning officer. Hence, the instant appeal. The question which arise for consideration are whether there is a substantial compliance in disclosing the requisite information in the affidavits filed by the D appellant along with the nomination paper; and whether non-disclosure of the information on account of said four aspects has materially affected the result of the election? Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. The reasons recorded by the High Court on each item of non-disclosure is accepted. Its finding about non-disclosure of the information qua all the aspects is without blemif;h. There is a specific format in which the information is to be given, which was not adhered to. [Para 33] [294-8] 1.2. In the given facts of the case, non-disclosure of E F the electricity dues, may· not be a serious lapse. No doubt, the dues were outstanding, at the same time, there G was a bona fide dispute about the outstanding dues in respect of the first electricity meter. It would have been better on the part of the appellant to give the information along with a note about the dispute, as suggested by the H 260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R. A High Court. It is still felt that when the appellant nurtured belief in a bona fide manner that because of the said dispute he is not to give the information about the outstanding amount, as it had not become 'payable', this should not be treated as a material lapse. Likewise, as far B as the second electricity meter is concerned, it was in the premises which was rented out to the tenants and the dues were payable by the tenants in the first instance. Again, in such circumstances, one can bona fide believe that the tenants would pay the outstanding amount. No c doubt, if the tenants did not pay the amount the liability would have been that of the owner, i.e. the appellant. However, at the time of filing the nomination, the appellant could not presume that the tenants would
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