KHUSHIRAM BEHARI LAL & CO. versus ASSESSING AUTHORITY, SANGRUR & ANR.
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A B c D E F G H 752 KHUSHiRAM BEHARI LAL & CO. v. ASSESSING AUTHORITY, SANGRUR & ANR. October 8, 1976 [H. R. KHANNA AND JASWANT SINGH, JJ.] fVrit jurisdiction of the lligh Court-Scope for interferellce with findings of iepa~tlnental authorities. In response to a notice from the assessing authority Uf!der the Punja'b General Sales Tax Act that the appeliant had not filed a return in respect of the assess- ment year 1959-60. the appellant claimed that tho firm: had ceased to do any w·ork since February. 1961 and that a formal document to that effect was ex- ecuted in August, 1961. The assessing authority made- an order of assessment in March 1962. In a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution filed' by the appeltant the High Court directed the Sales Tax Officer to enquire and repo1t if the appellant-firm had proved its dissolution in August 1961 or before the date oft assessment order. The Sales Tax Officer_ reported that it had not. The High Court itself examined the matter and came· to the same conclusion as that reached by the Sales Tax Officer. It alsQ' found that tho1igh intimation was required to be given under s. 16 of the Act regarding the dissolution of the firm \Vithin 30 days of such dissolution no such intin1ation \vas given under April, 1962 and dismissed the writ petition. Dismissing the appeal to this Court, · HELD: (1) There is no sufficient ground to interfere with the judgment of the High Court. The facts and circumstances referred to by the High Cour! throw a considerable doubt upon the correctness of the appellant's statement that it had stood dissolved in August, 1961. [754 D & BJ (2) The High Court Was dealing \vith th: matter on the writ side. In a: "''fit petition~ the scope for interference· with a finding of the departmental authorities is much more restricted and the court can normally interfere on.Ir if the finding is based upon extraneous or irrelevant evidence -or is otherwise perverse. The same cannot bo said of the finding of the sales tax authority embodied in its report sent to the High Court in the present C0tse. (75-4 C] CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 442 of 1974. (From· the Judgment and Order dated the 17th of August, 1970 cf the Punjab & Haryana High/ Court in Civil Writ No. 413/621. V. C. Mahajan and 0. P. Sharma, for the App=lbnt. Harbans Singh, for Respondent No. 2. The Judgment of tho Court was delivered by KHANNA, ~- This is an appeal on certificate agc1inst the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court whereby the_ High Court hold that the appellant-firm had failed to prove that it bad stood dissolved on a dato prior to tho date of assessment, viz., March 121 1962. The appellant-firm carries on business as commission agents of cotton and food grain'- In respect of the year 1959-60, the appel- lant did not submit any return under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act. A notice was thereupon issued to the appellant-firm and the r ' 1 KHUSHIRAM BEl-IARILAL v. ASSESSING AUTHORITY (Klu111na, J.) 7 53 case was fixed fo~ July l, 1960. The appellant challenged the vali- dity of the assessment proceedings by means of a writ petition in the High Court. The High Court during the pendency of the petition, stayed the proceedings. Ultimately, it seems, the writ petition was dismissed and the assessment proceedings were resumed on Novern- ber 30, 1961. Various dates were fixed thereafter. February 17, 1962 was fixed as the final date of hearing. On that date, intimation was given on behali of the appellant that.the appellant-firm had ceased to do any work since February 1961. It was also respresented that a formal document had been executed on August 8, 1961. The assessin,g authority despite that intimation proceeded to make an order of assessment dated March 12, 1962. The appellant thereupon filed another petition under article 226 of the Constitution in the Punjab High Court, praying for the- quashing of the assessment order. H was stated on behalf of tho appellant thnt the appellant-firm had been dissolved before the date of assessment order and as such, the sales tax authorities could not make an order for assessment. The High Court dismissed the petition on the ground that the assessment pro- ceedings had been initiated long before the alleged date of dissolution of the firm. The appellant thereafter came up to this Court in appeal against the ~aid decision of the High Court.
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