KHUDIRAM DAS versus THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS.

Citation: [1975] 2 S.C.R. 832 · Decided: 26-11-1974 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 25 judgment(s) · cites 2 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

832 
KHUDIRAM DAS 
'A 
v. 
THE STATE OF WEST BENGA.L & ORS. 
November 26, 1974 
[P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, P. N. BHAGWATI, P. K. GOSWAMI AND 
R. S. SARKARXA, JJ.) 
B 
Constitution of 1ndia, 1950, ·Art. 22(5)-Scope of-Power of detention if 
should satisfy Art. 19(1). 
Maintenance of ln(ernal Security Act, 1971, s. 3-Satisfaction of detaining 
authority, if subjective-Powe.r, if unreasonable-Right of Court ro exami11e 
record to see if detaining authority was influenced by material not disclosed to 
detenu-'Other particulars' meaning of-Duty lo disclose to detenu. 
The petitioner was detained by an order of the District Magistrate under 
s. 3(1) and (2) of the Maintenanee of Internal Security Act, 1971. The grounds 
of detention slate<) that the petitioner was involved in 3 incidents of removal 
of transformers and !heft of c.opper wires. disrupting the supply of water and 
electricity and thus acted in a manner prejudicial to the maint~nance of suppli~s 
and services essential to the community. The District Magistrate sent a report 
to the State Government sending along with the report, the history-sheet of t11e 
petitioner. The 
1 State Government after receiving the report" of the Adviso1ry 
Board confirmed the detention. 
In a petition under Art. 32, the petitioner challenged .his detention on the 
following grounds :-
(1) The 3 inddents of theft mentioned as. i:rounds of detention were n,~t 
. sufficient, objectively, to justify the District Mag1Strate's satisfaction that it w:as 
necessary to detain the petitioner; 
· 
(2) If the power to detain could be exercised on ti)e subjective satisfactinn 
of the detaining authority under the section, then it 
impo&~d unreasonable 
restrictions on the fundamental right of the petitioner under Art, 19(1); 
(3) The history sheet of the petitioner was before the Dist. Magistrate, 
who, though he' stated that beyond the 3 incidents mentioned in the grounds 
he did not take any other material into account in passing the detentfon orde:r. 
must have been inlluen:ed bir the other material in the history sheet; and 
since that material was not disclosed to the petitioner, there was a '!olaticin 
of Art. 22(S), a,nd ss. 3 and 8 of the Act. "and 
(4) The history sheet of the petitioner was also.before the State Government 
when it approved the order of detention and the State Government must al110 
have taken the material into account in confirming the detention order &Ild 
this was also contrary to the Constitutional mandate in Art. 22( S) and tlie 
legal mandate ir! ss. 3 and 8 of the J\,ct, to give him an opportunity to make 
an effective representation against his detention. 
Dismissing tlje petition, 
HELD : l(a) The Constitutional imperatives enacted in Art. 22(5) aro two 
fold : (i) the detaining authority mu~t. a~ soon as may be, that is, as soc•n 
as practicable after the detention. communicate to the detenu the ·grounds on whic:h 
the order has be,en made; and (ii) the deiaining authority must afford the detenu 
the earliest oppo,rtunity of making a representation against the detention order. 
In the context, 'grounds' doe"S not merely mean a recital or reproduction of a 
ground of satisfaction of the authority in the hmguage of s. 3; nor is .its connoil"° 
tion restricted to a bare statement of conclusion of fact. 
Nothln~s1 than all 
the basic focts alld materials which influenced the detaining autho 
' in making 
the order of detention must be communicale<l. to the detenu; [83$ : 840C] 
. 
(b) Th~ \11'.0rds ~sed i!t s. 3(1) and (2) are ~f ~tisfi~, amLtliey clearly 
import subiec!lve' satisfaction on .the part o.f the deteinlng,authorii~ .before an 
. 
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c 
D 
F 
G 
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A 
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D 
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KHUDIRAM v. WEST BENGAL (Bhagwati, J.) 
833 
order of detention can be made. The power of detention 
is a preventive 
measu.re. Since every preventive measure is based on the principle that a person 
should be prevented from doing something which, if left free and unfattered 
it is reasonably probable he would do, it must necessarily proceed in all cases, 
to some extent, on suspicion or anticipation as distinct from proof. This being 
the nature of the pro:eeding, it is impossible to conceive how it can possibly 
be regarded as capable of objective assessment. The matters which have to 
be considered by the detaining authority are. whetller the person concerned, having 
regard to his past conduct judged in the light of the surrounding circum1tances 
and other relevant material. would

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