KHARAK SINGH versus THE STATE OF U. P. & OTHERS

Citation: [1964] 1 S.C.R. 332 · Decided: 18-12-1962 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA · Disposal: Case Partly allowed

Cited by 20 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

.I 
\ 
. 1962 
Decemb::r, 18_ 
332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l!l64] VOL. 
KHARAK SINGH 
v .. 
THE STATE OF U. P. & OTHERS 
•. 
(B. P. SINHA, C.J., S.J. IMAM, K. Sunn.A Rao, 
J. C. SHAH, N. RaJAGOPALA AYYASG.AR, and 
J. R. l\1UDHOLKAR, JJ.) 
Fundamental Right, Enforcement of-Scope-Right 
to 
freedom of movement and personal liberty, wluther infringeil-
Sun·eillance-IVhether infringe.• any fundamental right-Consti-
tution of India, Arts. 19 (I) (d), 21,-32-U. P. Police Regula-
tions, ltegulation 236. _ -
--· 
_ 
. 
The petitioner \Vas Challenged in a· dacoity case but \vas 
released as there. \Va11 no evidence against him~ The police 
opened a history sheet against him. He was ·put under sur-
veillance . as defined in Regulation 236 of the U. P. Police 
Regu1ations. 
Surveillance involves secret pickecing of the house 
or approaches to the houses of the suspects, domiciliary visits 
at night,_ periodical enquiries by officers not below the rank 
of Sub-Inspector into repute, habits, association, 
income, 
expenses and occupation, the reporting by constables and 
chaukidars of movements and absences from _home, the verifi-
cation of movements and ·absences by means of inquiry slips 
and the collection and record on a history sheet of all informa-
t~on bearing on conduct. 
. . 
The petitioner filed a writ ·petition under Art. 32 in 
. which he challenged the constitutional validity of Chapter XX 
of U.' P. Police Regulations, in. which Regulation 236 also 
occurs. 
The defence of the respondent was that the impugned 
Regulations did not constitute an infringement of any of the 
freedoms guaranteed by Part III of the· C:onstitution, and even 
if they were, they had been framed in the interests of the 
General public and public order and to enable the police to 
discharge its duty in a more efficient manner, and hence were 
reasonable restrictions on that freedom. 
. 
. 
Held, (Subba Rao and ShahJJ., dissenting) that out of the 
· five kinds of surveillance referred to in Regulation 236, the 
part dealing with 
domiciliary visit.• was vjolative of Art. gr 
i S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
333 
of the Constitution and as there was no law on which the same 
'could be justified it must be struck down as unconstitutional, 
and the petitioner was entitled to a writ of mandamus direc-
ting the respouJent not to continue do1niciliary visits. 'l'hc 
other matters constituting surveillance were not unconstitutional. 
The secret picketing of the houses of the suspects could not in 
any material or palpable form affect either the right en the part 
of the suspect to 'move freely' or to deprive him of his 
'personal liberty' within the meaning of Art. 21. In dealin!( 
wiih a fundamental right such as the right to free inovemen t 
or personal liberty, that only can constitute an infringement 
which is both direct as well as tangible, and it could not be 
that under these freedoms the Constitution·makers intended to 
protect or protected 1ncre personal sensitiveness. The tern1 
'picketing' has been used in the Regulation not in the sense oI 
offering resistance to the visitor-physical or otherwise-or even 
dissuading him from entering the house of the suspect but 
merely of watching and keeping a record of the visitors. 
Clauses (c), (d) and (c) of Regulation 236 dealt with the 
details of the shadowirig of the history-sheeters for the 
pw·pose of having a record of their movements and activities 
and the obtaining of information relating to persons \vith 
whom they came into contact with a view to ascertain th; 
nature of their activities, and did not infringe any funda1ncat.,i l 
tight 
of 
the 
petitioner. The 
freedom guaranteed 
hy 
Art. 19 (1) (d) was not infringed by a watch Leing kept m·rr 
the movements of the suspect. Art. 21 was also not applicable. 
The suspect had the liberty to ansvver or not to ans'i\'rr the 
questions put to him by the police, and no Law provided for 
any civil or criminal liability if the suspect refused to ans\rer 
a qUcstion or remained silent. 
'l'hc right of privacy is not a 
guaranteed right under our Constitution, aud therefore the 
atte1npt to ascertain the rnoven1ents of an individual is merely 
a manner in which privacy is invaded and is not an infrinO'c-
ment of a fundamental right guaronteed in Part III. 
0 
The term 
'personal liberty' is used in Art. 21 as a 
compendious term to include \Vi thin itself all the varieties of 
rights which go to make up the 'personal Jiberties' of inan 
other tha

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