LexKEWAL SINGH versus LAJWANTI
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854
KEWAL SINGH
v.
LAJWANTI
October 4, 1979
(S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, P. S. KAl:LASAM AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]
Frame of Suit-Whether earlier giving up a cause of action by deletion from
the plaint and later on again requesting for inclusion of the same cause is barred
by tile principle of Order II Rule 2 C.P.C.
Doctrine of constructive Res-judicata-When it applies-Whether deletion of
a cause of action from the plaint anti again a request for inclusion would amount
to a bar of Res-judicata.
Delhi Rent Control Act, Section 25B-Whether violative of Art. 14 of the
Constitution.
The appellant was the tenant of respondent in Quarter No. IV-H/ 46 Lajpat
Nagar frqm 1-7~1967.
On 2-6-1976, the respondent filed an application under
Sections 14A(l), 14(l)(e) and· 14{1) (f) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, for
eviction of the appellant firstly on the ground that as. her husband was required
by the Government to vacate the Government quarters or pay the penal rent,
the husband of the respondent bad to shift ~o the house of his wife which was
in the tenancy of the defendant. A prayer was also made that even othemise
the premises were required for a bonafide necessity of the landlord and also
as the premises had become unfit for human habitation the respondent required
the same for carrying out repairs which could not be done unless the premises
were vacated. On 3-6·76 the respondent filed :m application withdrawing the causa
of action mentioned by her regarding bonafide necessity and repairs as contempla-
ted by Section 14(l)(e) and 14(l)(f) of the Act. The Rent Controller according-
ly allowed the plaintiff to withdraw the two ca·uses of action mentioned in the
application since no notice was served at this time on the appeUant. Thereafter
•otice was served on the appellant. On 4-6-1976, the plaintiff again sought to
amend her petition by deleting the cause of action mentioned under section
14A(l) of the Act i.e. requirement of the respondent because her husband had·
been directed to vacate the Government Quarter. On 13-8-1976 the appellant
appeared before the Rent Controller and filed an appliaction under section 25B,
sub sections 4 and 5 requesting the Rent Controller to give him permission to-
defend the suit, on the ground that as the landlady was not a Government ser-
vant she was not entitled to maintain the eviction petition under Section 14A(l)
of the Act. On 6-10-76 the husband of the respondent filed an application for
being impleaded a.~ a party, but this application was rejected on 22-11-76;
The resJ¥)ndent thereafter again filed another application on 27-1-77 praying for
amendment of her eYiction application by re-inserting the cause of action con~
tained in section 14{1)(e) of the Act and sought to claim eviction on the ground'
of bonafide requirement. .This application was contested by the appellant but
was allowed by the Rent Controller by his order dated 19-2-77 leaving open to·
the appellant to file his objection by a fresh application if he wanted to defend
the suit. The appellant accordingly filed an application on 9-3-77 for permission
to defend the suit on the ground that the amendment sought for by the pl-aintiff
was uncalled for and illegal and could not be allowed. Ultimately, the Rent
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KEWAL SINGH V. LAJWANTI
855
controller by his order dated 27-7-77 rejected the application for leave to appear
and defend the suit and passed an order evicting the appellant from the premises.
The revision petition filed by the appellant under Section 25B(8) in the Delhi
High Court was dismissed on 6-4-1978 and hence the appeal by special leave of
the Court.
It was contended : (a) that the second application given by the respondent for
re-a mending her plaint by inserting the relief under section 14 (1 )(e) which she
had given up at a prior occasion when she had based her suit under sectian ·
14A(l) was barred by the principles of Order II Rule 2 C.P.C. (b) that even if
Order n Rule 2 C.P.C., had no application, the second application filed by the
respondent was barred by the doctrfne of constructive
res-judicata and (c)
Section 25B which lays down the procedure for disposing of the applications
filed by the landlord under the provisions of Section 14A and 14(1)(e) are
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution inoomuch as the provisions are arbi-
trary and discriminatory in nature, and seek tO provide tWQ different pExcerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.