KEWAL CHAND MIMANI (D) BY LRS versus S.K. SEN AND ORS.

Citation: [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1056 · Decided: 23-07-2001 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: U.C. BANERJEE · Disposal: Dismissed
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Judgment (excerpt)

. A 
KEWAL CHAND rvtIMANI (D) BY LRS . 
'V. 
S.K. SEN AND ORS. 
JULY:23, 2001 
B 
[UMESH C. BANERJEE AND BRIJESH KUMAR, JJ.] 
West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948: Sections 
3(1) and 6(1)-Land Requisition-Suit land leased to lessee for 50 years-
Subsequently said land requisitim~ed-Writ petition challenging order of 
C requisition dismissed-Lease expir.~d by efflux of time during pendency of 
appeal-Transpositions application, by owners as appellants to conduct the 
appeal a/lowed-Meanwhile Act lapsed-High Court held requisition order 
could not continue due to lapse of, Act and directed State Government and 
Municipal Corporation to restore Rossession of suit land to the owner and/ 
D or occupier, as the case may be-High Court granted "liberty to mention" 
the matter in case of difficulty-Subsequently, on the matter being mentioned, 
High Court, in a second judgment,: directed making over of possession to the 
owners without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties and 
without prejudice to the rights of the lessee to file a suit for appropriate 
proceedings for recovery-Correctness of-Held: As the lease has expired by 
E efflux of time, the lessee has lost.' his possessory right-Hence, there is no 
question of putting back the lessee on to the possession. 
F 
Transfer of Property Act, 1882: 
Section I 16-Tenant ho/dint; over and te_nant-at-sufferance-Distinction 
between-Explained. 
Possession-Juridical poss¢ssion-Jmplication of Held: Cannot always 
be equated with lawful possession. 
Acquisition and Requisiti~n-Distinction between-Held: Acquisition 
G involves an element of permanency involving transfer of title-Whereas 
requisition is of temporary duration without rights of ownership. 
H 
Practice and Procedure: 
"Liberty to mention"- Scope and ambit of-Held: It is a legal process 
1056 
J 
, 
K.L. MIMAJ'll v. S.K. SEN 
1057 
for shortening of litigation-It does not give jurisdiction to the court to A 
reopen an issue already decided-Review of a judgement cannot be resorted 
to on the basis of this liberty-Code of Civil procedure, I 908-0rder 4 7. 
Words and Phrases: 
"Trespass "-Meaning of 
The respondents-owners leased out their land to the appellants-lessees 
for a period of 50 years. During the currency of the lease the suit land was 
requisitioned under Section 3(1) of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and 
Acquisition) Act, 1948. The appellant's writ petition challenging the order 
B 
of requisition was dismissed. During the pendency of the appeal before the C 
High Court the lease expired by efflux of time. After expiry of about 9 years 
the respondents filed an application for being transposed as appellants to 
conduct the pending appeal, which was allowed. However, before pronouncement 
of judgment the Act lapsed by efflux of time. Therefore, the High Court held 
that the requisition order could riot continue due to lapse of the Act and 
directed the State Government and Municipal Corporation to restore D 
possession of suit land to the owner and/or occupier, as the ca~e may be. But 
the High Court granted "liberty to mention" the matter in the event of any 
difficulties. Subsequently, on the matter being mentioned on behalf of the 
State and an application filed by owners for a direction to restore possession 
to them, the High Court, directed ,making over of possession to the owners E 
without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties and without 
prejudice to the rights of the lessee to file a suit for appropriate proceedings 
for recovery. Hence this appeal. 
On behalf of the appellants it was contended that the High Court had 
no jurisdiction to reopen the issue' on the ground of grant of "liberty to F 
mention" the matter and that if possession has been taken from a particular 
person the same ought to be allowed to be received back by that person and 
none other. 
On behalf of the respondents it was contended that under Section 6(1) 
of the Act it was incumbent upon the state Government to make an inquiry G 
and ascertain the factum of entitlement to possession and the possession 
ought to be delivered in accordance therewith to the person concerned. 
The following questions arose before this Court :-
(1) Whether a lessee, after expiry of lease by lapse of time, continues H 
1058 
SUPREMij COURT REPORTS 
I 
[2001) 3 S.C.R. 
A to be in lawful possession of leasehold property, assuming there was no 
· requisition of the premises; or alternatively is he
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