LexKESHO RAM & CO. & ORS. ETC. versus UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
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KESHO RAM & CO. & ORS. ETC. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. MAY 2, 1989 [K.N. SINGH, M.H. KANIA AND L.M. SHARMA, JJ.] f ·. ' Constitution of India, 1950: Article 141-Court's decision- Binding effect of-Does not depend on whether a particular a.rgume111 was considered or not. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949: Sections 3, 13 and Notification dated September 24, 1974-Cdnstitutional validity a/- Exemption granted to new buildings in urban area of Chandigarh for five years-Jurisdiction of Civil Court to pass eviction decree. The appellants/petitioners are tenants of bt•ildings situate within A c the Urban Territory of Chandigarh. The buildings occupied by them as D tenants were exempted from the operation of section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act J 949 for a period of five years under the notification dated September 24, 1974 issued under Section 3 of the Act. The landlords of these buildings bad filed in the Civil Court suits for eviction against the tenants. During the pendency of those suits, the five years period expired. 'f.hereupon the tenants raised objections on E the ground that (a) the suits could not be decreed in view of the provisions of section 13 of the Act, which had placed an embargo on the landlord's right to get his tenant evicted or to obtain possession ·of the building except in accordance with the provisions of section 13, and (b) the civil court had no jurisdiction to pass a decree of eviction or to execute tho same against a tenant. F The validity of section 3 of the Act as well as the validity of the notification dated 24th September, 1974 were assailed before this Court earlier on two occasions. In Amarnath Basheshar Dass v. Tek Chand, [1972] 3 SCR 922 this Court had upheld the notification granting exemption and had further held that if the suit was instituted within the G period of exemption, decree could be passed even after the expiry of the period of five years, and the same could be executed. In Punjab Tin Supply Company Chandigarh v. Central Government & Ors., [1984) 1 SCR 428 this Court had held that the notification granting exemption advanced the scheme, object and purposes of the Act, and it did not violate any of the provisions of the Act and was not discriminatory, H 1005 . . A B c 1006 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989) 2 S.C.R. arbitrary or unreasonable. ). In the instant cases, another attempt has been made to challenge the validity of section 3 and the notification on some additional grounds. The submissions made by the counsel are: (i) Section 3 is unconstitu- tional as it delegates essential legislative function to the Central Govern- ment without laying down any guidelines for exercise of the power of exemption; (ii) the notification enlarges the period of exemption for an, , indefinite period, tends to amend section 13 of the Act, and is contrary to the object and purpose of the Act; rather it defeats the protection granted to a tenant by the Act; (iii) the notification is discriminatory as it creates two class of tenants; tenants of old buildings which never enjoyed the exemption from the provisions of the Act, and the tenants of the newly constructed buildings which are denied the protection of the Act. "° Dismissing the appeals and the writ petitions, this Court, D HELD: (I) Some of the tenants in the instant cases were parties before this Court in Punjab Tin Supply Company, case. The petitions by such tenants are not maintainable as the same are b'!qed by princi- ples ofres-judicata. Finality in litigation and public policy both requir't· that a litigant should not be permitted to challenge the validity of the provisions of the Act or Notification at different times on different E grounds. Once petitioners' challenge to section 3 and the notificatilln had been considered by the Court and the validity of the same upheld, it must be presumed that all grounds which could validly have been raised were raised and considered by the Court. [IOISG-H; 1016A] (2) The binding effect of a decision of this Court does not depend F upon whether a particular argument was considered or not, provided the point with reference to which the argument is advanced subse- quently was actually decided in the earlier decision. [1016C] / Smt. Somavanti & Ors. v. State of Punjab, [1963) 2 SCR 774; T. Govindaraja Muda!iar v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1973] I SCC 336 and G Anil Kumar Neotia v. Union of In
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