KESHAVAN MADHAVA MENON versus THE STATE OF BOMBAY

Citation: [1951] 1 S.C.R. 228 · Decided: 22-01-1951 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 1 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

1951 
J ... 22 
228 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1951] 
KESHAVAN MADHAVA MENON 
"· 
THE STATE OF BOMBAY 
[Smu HAru1.AL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAZL Au, 
PATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, 
MuKHEJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.] 
Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 13 (!)-Whether retrospective 
Prosecution 
for 
contravention 
of 
lndi'an 
Press (Emergency 
Powers) 
Act, 
1931, 
ss. 15, 
IS-Constitution 
passed 
during 
pendency 
of 
prosecution-Laws inconsistent 
with 
fundamental 
rights 
declared 
void-Whether prosecution can 
be 
continued-
A.bsence 
of provision saving 
pending proceedi1lgs-Effect a/-
Expiry of temporary laws or repeal of laws, and laws becoming 
void 
by 
statutory 
declaration.-Difference-Interpretation-
Spirit of the Constitution. 
Held by the Court 
(KANIA C.J., 
PATANJALI 
SASTRI, 
MElD. 
CHAND 
MAHAJAN, 
DAs 
and 
CHANDRASEKHARA 
AIYAR 
JJ.-FAzL 
Au and MuKHERJEA fl., dissenting) .. . Article 13(1) of the Indian 
Constitution docs not make existing laws which are inconsistent 
with fundamental 
rights void 
ab inito, 
but only 
renders such 
laws ineffectual and Void 
with respect to 
the exercise of 
funda-
mental rights on and after the date of the commencement of the 
Constitution. 
It has no retrospective effect, and if therefore an 
act was done before the commencement of the new Constitution 
in contravention of the provisions of any la\\'· which was a valid 
law at the - time of the commission of the act, a prosecution for 
such an act, which was commenced before the Constitution can1e 
into force can be proceeded 
with and the accused punished 
according to that law, even after the commencement of the new 
Constitution. 
On the expiry of a temporary statute no 
further 
proceedings 
can be taken 
under it 
unless the 
statute itself 
saved 
pending 
proceedings and if an offence had been committed under a 
tern~ 
porary 
statute and 
proceedings were 
initiated but the 
offender 
had not been 
prosecuted and 
punished before the expiry of the 
statute, then in the absence of a saving clause the pending prose~ 
cution -cannot be proceeded- with after the expiiy of the statute 
by effiux of time. The effect of Art. 13(1) is quite different from 
that of the expiry of a temporary statute or the repeal of a statute 
by a subsequent statute. 
A court of law has to gather the spirit of the 
Constitution 
from the language of the Constitution. 
What one may 
believe 
or wish to be the spirit of the Constitution cannot prevail if the 
language of. the Co.nstitution OOe. not support that view. 
S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
229 
Per FAzL ALI and MuKHERJEA JJ. (contra)-Though Art. 13(1) 
has no retrospective 
operation, and 
transacclons 
which arc 
past 
and closed and rights which have already vested will · remain 
unt0uchcd, with regard to· inchoate matters which were still not 
determined 
when. the. Constitution came into force, 
and as 
regar.ds proceedings 
which were 
pending at the time of the 
enforcement of the Constitution and not yet prosecuted 
to a 
final judgment, a law which has become void under Art 13( 1) of 
the Constitution cannot be applied. 
What has to be looked at is 
the ~tate of the law at the time when the question arises as to 
whether a person has committed an offence, and if it is found that 
the law which made the act an offence has 
become completely 
ineffectual and nugatory, then neither can a charne be framed nor 
can the accused person be convicted. 
Judgment of the Bombay High Court affirmed. 
APPELLATE JuRISDICTION: Appeal under Art. 132(1) 
of the Constitution from a judgment and order dated 
12th April, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature _at 
Bombay 
(Chagla 
C.J., 
Bavdekar 
and 
Shah 
JJ.) 
Case no. IX of 1950. 
A. S. R .. Chari, for the appellant. 
M. C. Setalvad. Attorney General for India (G. 
N. Joshi, with him) for the respondent. 
1951. Jan. 22. The judgment of Kania C.J., Patan-
jali Sastri J. Das J. and Chandrasekhara Aiyar J. was 
delivered by Das J. Mahajan J. and Fazl Ali J. 
delivered 
separate 
judgments. Mukherjea J. 
agreed 
with Fazl Ali J. 
1951 
Eiiluzuan 
Madha~aM-· 
•• 
Thl~tateqf 
BOfllba, 
DAs J.-At all material times the petitioner, who · is 
Du J 
the appellant before us, was the Secretary of People's 
Publishing 
House, 
Ltd., 
a 
company 
incorporated 
under the Indian Companies Act 
with 
its registered 
office at 190-B, Khedwadi Main Road in Bombay. In 
September, 
1949, 
a 
pamphlet 
entitled 
"Railway 
Mazdovron ke khil

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