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KERALA STATE CASHEW DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION versus SHAHAL HASSAN MUSSALIAR & ANR.

Citation: [2009] 4 S.C.R. 419 · Decided: 16-03-2009 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: ARIJIT PASAYAT · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

\ 
(2009) 4 S.C.R 419 
KERALA STATE CASHEW DEVELOPMENT 
CORPORATION 
V. 
SHAHAL HASSAN MUSSALIAR & ANR. 
Civil Appeal No. 8247 of 2001 
MARCH 16, 2009 
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND P. SATHASIVAM, JJ.] 
A 
B 
Kera/a Cashew Factories (Requisitioning) Act, 1979, as 
amended by Act No.26 of 1985 - s.3 - Requisition and 
acquisition - Difference between - Discussed - s.3 of the Act C 
empowered the State Goyernment to requisition cashew 
factories leased to Kera/a State Cashew Development 
Corporation for maximum period of five years - Amending 
Act of 1985 purportedly removed the limitation of five years 
and enabled the State Government to requisition such cashew D 
factories for an indefinite period of time - Challenge to - Held: 
The State cannot under the guise of requisition continue 
dominion over someone's property for an indefinite period of 
time, because that would be a fraud on the power conferred on 
the government - If the Government wants to take over the 
E 
property for an indefinite period of time, the Government must 
acquire the property - The power of requisitioning would be 
upheld, if it is to be exercised for a temporary duration, which 
is limited either in terms of time or by reason of a contingency 
- Constitutionalism - Colourable legislation. 
F 
Section 3 of the Kerala Cashew Factories 
(Requisitioning) Act, 1979 empowered the State 
Government to requisition cashew factories leased to 
, • .. 
Kerala State Cashew Development Corporation for a G 
maximum period of five years. 
The Amending Act of 1985 (Act No. 26 of 1985) 
purportedly removed the limitation of five years an.d 
419 
H 
420 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2009] 4 S.C.R. 
A enabled the State Government to requisition such cashew 
factories for an indefinite period of time. 
In the instant appeals, the question which arose for 
consideration was: whether where any statute 
empowered the State to continue to extend a requisition 
8 order for an indefinite period, it is an order for acquisition 
and, therefore, a colourable exercise of power which is 
not available to the State under the Act. 
Dismissing the appeals, the Court 
C 
HELD:1. The two concepts, one of requisition and 
the other of acquisition, are totally distinct and 
independent. Acquisition means the acquiring of the 
entire title of the expropriated owner, whatever the nature 
and extent of that title may be. The entire bundle of rights 
D which was vested in the original holder passes on 
acquisition to the acquirer, leaving nothing to the former. 
The concept of acquisition has an air of permanence and 
finality in that there is transference of the title of the original 
holder to the acquiring authority. In contradistinction, the 
E concept of requisition involves merely taking of domain 
or control over property without acquiring rights of 
ownership and must by its very nature be of temporary 
duration. The State cannot under the guise of requisition 
continue dominion over some one's property for an 
F indefinite period of time, because that would be a fraud 
on the power conferred on the government. If the 
Government wants to take over the property for an 
indefinite period of time, the Government must acquire 
the property, but it cannot use the power of requisition 
G which is exercisable by the Government only for a public 
purpose which is of a transitory character. If the public 
purpose for which the premises are required is of a 
perennial or permanent character from the very inception, 
no order can be passed requisitioning the premises and, 
H in such a case, the order of requisition, if passed, would 
KERALA STATE CASHEW DEV. CORP. V. 
421 
SHAHAL HASSAN MUSSALIAR & ANR. 
• 
be a fraud upon the statute, for the Government would be A 
requisitioning the premises, when really speaking they 
want the premises for acquisition, the object of taking the 
premises being not transitory but permanent in character. 
Where the purpose for which the premises are required 
is of such a character that from the very inception it can B 
never be served by requisitioning the premises, but it can 
be achieved only by acquiring the property, which would 
~ 
be the case where the purpose is of a permanent 
character or likely to subsist for an indefinite period of 
time, the Government may acquire the premises, but it c 
certainly cannot requisition the premises and continue 
the requisitioning indefinitely. [Para 15) 
1.2. The power of requisitioning would be upheld, if 
it is t

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