KAVALAPPARA KOTTARATHIL KOCHUNI AND OTHERS versus THE STATE OF MADRAS AND OTHERS

Citation: [1960] 3 S.C.R. 887 · Decided: 04-05-1960 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA · Disposal: Case Partly allowed

Cited by 33 judgment(s) · cites 1 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

• 
3 S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
887 
against the excess dividends. In our opinion, the 
z960 
question of modification of the language cannot arise Commissioner of 
in the circumstances of the case. Our reasons have 
.Income-tax, -
been given in Civil Appeal No. 427 of 1957, decided to-
Bombay 
day, and we need not go over the ground again. 
v. 
. . 
Th 
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1 
t" 
f 
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1 d Th Jalgaon Electricity 
ere is a so no ques 10n o unJUS ness invo ve . 
e supply co. Ltd. 
Income-tax law seeks to p11t in the net certain class 
of income, and can only successfully do so, if it frames Hidayatullah J. 
a provision appropriate to that end. If the law fails 
and the tax-payer cannot be brought within its letter, 
no question of unjustness as such, arises. The answers 
given by the High Court to the two questions were 
correct in the circumstances of the case. 
In the result, the appeal fails, and will be dismissed 
with costs. 
Appeal dismissed . 
KA V ALAPPARA KOTTARATHIL KOCHUNI 
AND OTHERS 
v. 
THE STATE OF MADRAS AND OTHERS 
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., JAFER IMAM, A. K. SARKAR, 
K. SUBBA RAO and J. C. SHAH, JJ.) 
Marumakkathayam Law-Enactment for removal of doubts-
Constitutional validity-Madras Marumakkathayam (Removal of 
Doubts) Act, I955 (32 of r955)-Constitution of India, Arts. r9(r) 
(f), ]I, 3rA. 
These petitions by the holder of Kavalappara Sthanam, his 
wife, daughters and son challenged the constitutional validity of 
the Madr8s Marumakkathayam (Removal of Doubts) Act, 1955, 
passed by the Madras Legislature soon after the Privy Council 
had declared the properties in possession of the Sthanee to be 
Sthanam properties in which the members of the tarwad had no 
interest. Section 2 of the Act, which contained the substantive 
provision, was as follows:--
" 2. Notwithstanding any decision of Court, any sthanam in 
respect of which :-
~a) there is or had been at any time an intermingling of the 
properties of the sthanam and the properties of the tarwad, or 
(b) the members of the tarwad have been receiving main-
tenance from the properties purporting to be sthanam properties 
as of right, or in pursuance of a custom or otherwise, or 
(c) there had at any time been a vacancy caused by there 
being no male member of the tarwad eligible to succeed to the 
Sthanam, 
I960 
May 4. 
f( avalnppaya 
K nlt11Yathil 
Kochuni 
v. 
Stale of Madt"as 
888 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1960] 
shall be deemed to be and shall be deemed always to have 
been a Marumakkathayam tarwad and the properties appertain-
ing to such a sthanam shall be deemed to be and shall be deemed 
always to have been properties belonging to the tarwad to which 
the provisions of the Madras Marumakkathayam Act, 1932 (Mad. 
XXII of 1933), shall apply." 
The question for decision was whether the impugned Act 
infringed the fundamental rights of the petitioners guaranteed by 
Arts. 4, 19(r)(f) and 31 of the Constitution. 
Held (per Sinha, C. J., Subba Rao and Shah, JJ.) that the 
three tests laid down by the Act were contrary to the well-settled 
principles of Marumakkathayam Law with regard to which there 
could be no scope for doubt and as such not only not germane but 
extraneous to the object it sought to achieve. They were a device 
to deprive the sthanam of its properties and vest them in the 
tarwad and as such directly hit by Art. 19(r)(f) and could not be 
saved by Art. 1915). 
Assuming that the Sthanam properties were held in janmam 
right and as such were estates within the meaning of Art. 31A, 
tbe impugned Act was immune from challenge. That Article, 
properly construed, envisages agrarian reform and provides for 
the acquisition, extinguishment or modification of proprietory 
and various other kinds of subordinate rights in a tenure called 
the estate solely for that purpose arid must be limited to it. 
Although it may not be permissible to refer to the statement of 
objects and reasons of its amendment for purposes of construction, 
it can be referred to for the limited purpose of ascertaining the 
conditions prevailing at the time and purpose underlying the 
amendment. 
Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, [1953] S.C.R. 1, con-
sidered. 
There is no substance in the argument that since the 
impugned Act seeks to regulate the rights of the Sthanee and the 
junior members of the tarwad inter se it falls within by cl. (2)(b) 
of Art. 31A. That clause has to be read with cl. (1)(a) of the 
Article and since the impugned Act does not contemplate any 
agraria

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