LexKAUSHALYA RANI versus GOPAL SINGH
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1963 September 20 982 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1%4] KAUSHALYA RANI v. GOPAL SINGH (B. P. SINHA, C; J., J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYAN- GAR, JJ.) Code of Criminal Procedure, s. 417(3), (4)-Accused acquit- ted by Additional Sessions Judge-/lpplication for special leave to appeal to High Court against acquittal filed after 60 days of order-Provisions of Limitation Act, s. 5, whether applicable-Spe- dal law-Limitation Act (9 of 1908) s. 29(2). The respondent was committed to the Court of Sessions to stan<l his trial. However, he \vas acquitted by the Additional Ses- sions Judge on December 31, 1959. The appellant filed on April 22, 1960, an application under s. 417(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the High Court for Special Leave to appeal from the order of the Additional Sessions Judge. The High Court dis- missed the appeal on the ground that the application for special leave to appeal \Vas barred by time. It was held that the provisions of s. 417(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure were in the nature of a special law and the provisions of s. 5 of the Limitation Act were not applicable. The appellant ca1ne to this Court after getting a certificate of fitness to appeal to this Court. Dismissing the appeal, HELD : (i) The special rule of limitation laid down in s. 417(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a special law of limi- tation· governing appeals by private prosecutors and s. 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply in view of s. 29(2)(b) of the Limi- tation Act. A special law 1neans a law enacted for special cases, in special circu1nstances, in contra~distinction to the general rule of law laid down as applicable generally to all cases with which general law deals. In that sense, the Code of Criminal Procedure is a general la\v regulating the procedure for the trial of criminal cases generally. When it lays down the bar of time in respect of special cases, in special circumstances, like those contemplated by s. 417(3) and (4), it is a special law contained within the general law. Likewise, the Lin1itation Act is a general law laying dovvn general rules of li1nitation applicable to all cases dealt with by the Act, but there may be instances of a special lavv of limitation laid down in other statutes, though not dealing generally with the law of Lin1itation. S. M. Thakur v. The State of Bihar, 30 Pat. 126; Canara Bank Ltd. v. The Warden Insurance Co., LL.R. [1952] Bom. 1083; Mohammad lbmhim v. Gopi Lal, A.LR. (1958) All. 691; Rajjan Lal v. State l.L.R. [1960] 2 All. 761; Vistvanathan Chettiar, in re. (1957) 1 M.L.J. 150; Coimbatore Municipality v. K. L. Naraya· nan, A.LR. (1958) Mad. 416; P. V. Subbareddi, v. D. Papireddi, - • r- - 1 - 4 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 983 A.IR. (1957) An<lh. Pra. 406; In re Parchuri Adeshamma, A.LR. (1958) Andh. Pra. 230; Anjanabai v. Yeshwantrao Daulatruo Dudhe, 1.L.R. [1961 J Born. 135, referred to. CRIMIN'AL APPELLATE JmusOJcTJON Criminal Appeal No. 126 of 1962. Appeal from the judgment and order dated October 31, 1%1 of the Punjab High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 825 of 1960. Vidya Dhar lvfahajan, for the appellant. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SINHA, C. J.-In th.is appeal, on a certificate of fit- ness granted by the Punjab High Court, the only ques- tion for determination is whether the provisions of s. 5 of the Limitation Act (9 of 1908) apply to an appli- cation for special leave to appeal, from an order of acquittal, under sub-s. (3) of s. 417 of the Code of Cri- minal Procedure (to be hereinafter referred to as the Code). The certificate was granted by the High Court "because there is a considerable cnnAict of opinion in the various High Courts". In this case we are not concerned with the factual aspect of the controversy between the parties. It is not, therefore, necessary to set out in any detail the facts of that controversy. It is enough to state that the respondent was committed to the Court of Sessions to stand his trial under s. 493, or in the alternative under s. 495, of the Indian Penal Code, on the charge that he had, by deceit, caused the appellant who was not lawfully married to him to believe that she was so married, and in that belief had sexual intercourse with her. In the alternative, it was alleged that he married the appellant after concealing the fact that he was already married. The prosecution was launched by a petition of com- plaint filed
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