LexaceLexace Ask the AI ›
⚖️ Ask the AI about your situation:🚗 Car Accident💼 Work / Job🏠 Housing / Eviction👪 Family / Divorce📋 Contract Dispute💰 Money Owed

KARTAR SINGH AND OTHERS versus STATE OF HARYANA THROUGH INSPECTOR GENERAL OF PRISON, CHANDIGARH

Citation: [1983] 1 S.C.R. 445 · Decided: 26-08-1982 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: V.D. TULZAPURKAR · Disposal: Dismissed

cites 1 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this case

Judgment (excerpt)

• 
• 
\' 
445 
A 
kARTAR StNGH ANO OTHERS 
v. 
STATE OF HARYANA THROUGH INSPECTOR 
GENERAL QF PRISON, CHANDIGARH 
August 26, 1982' 
[V.D. TULZAPURKAR, BAHARUL lsLAM AND 
R.B. MISRA, JJ.] 
Criminal Procedure Code-s. 428-App/icability to persons sentenced to 
imprisonment for life-construction of . 
Under s. 428. Cr. P.C., an accused perSQn sentenced to imprisonment for 
B 
c 
a term is entitled to set oft' bis under-trial period of detention against the sen-
D 
tence imposed upon him. 
The petitioners were life-convicts undergoing sentence in different Jails in 
Haryana. Under _para 516-B of the Punjab/Haryalla Jail Manual they were 
entitled to be considered for premature release on their completing 8-1/2 years of 
·substantive impri~onment and 14 years of imprisonment including remissions. 
According tri the petitioners, if.the period.of their unde_r-trial detention was added 
to their' total Period of imprisonment including remissions, the total detention 
would exceed 14 years and thCir continued deterition·would be illegal. In Maru 
Ram v: Union of India and Anr., [1981] 1 _S.C.R. 1196 it bad been held that the 
mandatory minimum of 14 years' actual imprisonment specified ins. 433-A, Cr. 
P.C., would not '.operate against those· 'lifers' 'YhoSe conviction by the court of 
first instance had been entered prior to 18th December," 1978, and that they woula 
bO entitled to consideration by Government f0r premature release on the strength 
of the remissions· earned under the relevant rules. The Government ofHaryana 
had bY its Order dated 2nd "February, 1981, decided that the benefit of the period 
of under-trial detention should not be given to lire-convicts who had been convic-
ted before 18th December, 1978. The petitioners submittCd that .the said order 
was invalid for the reason that it wrongfully .. denied to the1n the benefit of the set 
oO: contemplated under s. 428, Cr. P.C. 
Counsel for the petitioners contended that cases of life-convicts would fal1 
within the terms of s. 428 as : 
(i) persons sentenced to imprisonment for life could be said to have 
been sentenced to their life·term which under the provisions of the 
Penal Code and Jail Manual was regard"ed as eqwivalent to 20 years 
or !4ye!ll'81 
E 
F 
G 
H 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
446 
I 
SU~REMil COURT Rffi;oRTS 
(1983] l s.c.ii. 
. 
. . 
(ii) . when remissions are actually granted to life-convicts their sentences 
become imprisonments for. a term; 
• (iii) when convicts other than life~convicts were entitled to the benefit 
~ 
of the set off contemplated under the section there was ho reaSon 
why life·convicts should be denied that advantage. 
Dismissing the petition, 
HELD: ·On a plain reading of s. 428, Cr. P.C., it is clear that the cases 
of the petitioners, who have been sentenced to imprisonment for life, would not· 
fall within the section, for, the section applies to an accused person who·has on 
conviction been sentenced to imprisonment for. a te~m. · [450 H; 451 A] 
(b) A perusal .of Several sections of the Indian Penal Code as well as 
Criminal Procedure Code would show that both the Codes make and maintain a 
clear 
distinction 
between 
HjmprisoD.me.nt for 
life'' 
and 
"imprisonment 
for a term"; in -fact, 
the two 
expressions "imprisonment _for life" and 
"impi:isonment for a term" have been used in, contradistinction with each other 
in one and the satne section, where the former must mean imprisonment for the 
remainder of the natural life of the convict and latter must mean imprisonment 
for a definite or fixed period: Having regard to such distinction which is being 
maintained in ·botb- the· Codes; it will be diffictilt to slur over the distinction on 
the basis that life-convicts should be regarded as having been sentenced to a life. 
term or to say that the two could be understood as irlterchangeable expressions 
because, basically, the life-term of any accused 'is uncertain. Section 57. I.P.C. 
or the Remission Rules contained in Jail Manuals are irrelevanl in this context. 
It is weJI settfed that a Sentence for imprisonment for life must be treated as 
imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of the convicted person's 
natural life. [4_51 F-H; 452 D-E; 452 G; 453 A] 
Kishori Lal v. Emperor; A.LR. [1945] P.C. 64; Gopal Vinayak Godse v. 
The State of Maharashtra [1961] 3 S.C.R. 440; Maru Ram v. The Union of India 
and Anr. [1981] l S.C.R. 1196; and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ratan Singh & 
Ors .• [1976] Supp. S.C.R.

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.