KARIMBIL KUNHIKOMAN versus STATE OF KERALA
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!96J K°CTiJUiJ K•~itomall •• Slal1 of Knalo S:JO SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP. Puru•hothaman Nambudiri v. Stal< of Kera/a, [1962) Supp. I S.C.R. 753, followed. (II) The Act which made certain deductions from the compensation payable to the landholders under Ch. II and to others who held excess land under Ch. III cannot be struck doY.n as a piece of colourable legislation which is be- yond the competence of the State Legislature, and it cannot be said that any device has been employed in the Act to take away the moneys of the landbwners or the versons from whom excess land is taken away for the purpose of adding to the revenue of the State. Section 80 'of the Act provides for the Constitution of an agriculturist rehabilitation fund for the purpose of rendering help by way of loan, grant or otherwise to persons affected by the Act and eligible for the same under the rules but rr. 161 (a) (III) and 161 (b) (Ill) are so framed as to take within their scope even persons not affected by the Act. Those rules are ultra viru of s. 80 and must be struck down. (Ill) The lands held by ryotwari pattadars in the area which came to the State of Kerala by virtue of the States Reorganisation Act from the State of Madras are not •estates' within the meaning of Art. 31A(2J(a) of the Cons- titution and therefore the Act is not protected under Art. 31A ( 1) from attack under Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Cons- titution. State of Bihar v. Ramtahwar Pralap Narain Singh, A.l.R. 1961 S.C. 1649, referred to. (IV) The reasons which call for exemption of tea, coffee and rubber plantations. from certain provisions of the Act equally apply to areca and pepper plantations and there is no intelligible differentia related to the object and purpose of the Act which would justify any distinction in the ca•e of tea, coffee and rubber plantations as against areca and pep- per plantation~. The provisions in the Ac.t rc.!ating to planta- tions are violative of Art. 14 of the Conslltut10n. The provisions relating to plantatioru cannot be severed from the Act and struck down only by themselves. The whole Act must be struck down as violative of Art. 14 of the Cons- titution so far as it applied to ryotwari fands in those areas of the State which were transferred to 1t from the State of Madras. (V) The manner in which ceiling. has been.fixed. under s. 58( l) is violative of the fundament~l r.•ght enshrined m A~t. 14 of the constitution and as that sect1?n ';8 the basis of entire Ch. III the whole chapter must fall with 11; (1) S.C.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS 831 (IV' The manner in which progressive cuts have been imposed on the purchase price under s. 52 and the market value under s. 64 in order to determine the compensation pay- able to lando\vners or intermediaries in one case and to per- sons from whom excess land is taken in another, results in dis- crimination and cannot be justified on any intelligible differentia which has any relation to the objects and purposes of the Act. The provision as to compensation is all pervasive and the entire Act must be struck down a• violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution in its application to ryotwari lands which have come to the State of Kerala from the State of Madras. Per Sarkar, J .-Sections 52 and 64 of the Act which pro- vide for payment of Compensation at progressively smaller rates for larger valuations of the interests acquired are not in- valid as offending Art. 14 of the Constitution. The provisions in the act making a discrimination in favour of tea, coffee, rubber and cardamom plantalion and also in favour of cashew plan- tations cannot be upheld. Sections 3(viii), 57 (1) (d) and 59 (2) are therefore invalid. These are however severable from the other parts of the Act and the whole Act cannot be held to be bad merely because those provisions are bad. Per Ayyangar, ].-Properties held on ryotwari tenures and the interest of the ryot in such lands would not be "esta- tes" for the purposes of Art. 31A(2) as it stood even after the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution. Where an existing law in relation to land-tenures in force in an area contains a definition of an 'estates' and that defini .. tion excludes the interest of a ryotwari proprietor, the very words of Art. 3 IA(2) of the Constitution negatived the appli- cability of its provisions to that tenure. Ram R4m Narain Medhi, v. Stale of Bombay, [1959] Supp. I S.C.R. 489 and Atma Ram v
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