LexaceLexace Ask the AI ›
βš–οΈ Ask the AI about your situation:πŸš— Car AccidentπŸ’Ό Work / Job🏠 Housing / EvictionπŸ‘ͺ Family / DivorceπŸ“‹ Contract DisputeπŸ’° Money Owed

KARANPURA DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD. versus RAJA KAMAKSHYA NARAIN SINGH.

Citation: [1956] 1 S.C.R. 325 · Decided: 10-04-1956 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: SUDHI RANJAN DAS · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this case

Judgment (excerpt)

-
S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
KARANPURA DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD. 
v. 
RAJA KAMAKSHYA NARAIN SINGH. 
325 
[S. R. DAS, C.J., BHAGWATI and VENKATARAMA 
AYYAR JJ.] 
Court of Wards-Powers-Transactions by Court of Wards-
Court's power to review-Court of Wards acting on behalf of a ward 
and a guardian acting on behalf of a minor-Difference in the legal 
position of-Licences extending beyond the period of the minority of 
the ward-Validity-Sanction-Requirements-Ooitrt of Wards Act, 
1879 (Bengal Act IX of 1879), s. 18-Guardians and Wards Act, 
1890 (VIII of 1890), s. 29( a). 
Section 18 of the Court of Wards Act, 1879, provides that the 
Court of Wards "may sanction the giving of leases or farms of the 
whole or part of any property under its charge, and may direct the 
mortgage or sale of any part of such property, and may direct the 
doing of all such other acts as it may judge to be most for the benefit 
of the property and the advantage of the ward". 
In exercise of the power conferred by this section the Court of 
Wards sanctioned a deed of prospecting license in favour of l3, the 
predecessor in interest of the appellant, and the same was executed 
on 26-3-1915. Subsequently, on 23Β·11Β·1917 the manager of the 
Court of Wards executed a deed modifying the terms of the deed 
dated 26-3Β· 1915, by. virtue of which the period of license could be 
extended up to 26-3-1951 under certain conditions. On 10-8-1937 
the respondent having become major assumed management of the 
estate and thereafter repudiated the aforesaid deeds and contested 
their validity on the grounds, inter alia, (1) that the deed dated 
26-3-1915 was not for the benefit of the ward as the clause therein 
relating to the payment of the cess was less advantageous to him 
than the corresponding clause in the prospecting license executed 
by the then proprietor of the estate on 26-11-1907 in respect of 
another property known as the Bokaro license, and that the Court 
of Wards executed the deed in question without bestowing any 
thought to it, (2) that the Court of Wards had no power to enter into 
the transaction dated 23-11-1917 as it had the effect of preventing 
the ward from dealing with his estate for over a period of 32 years 
after he attained majority, (3) that in granting the deed dated 
23-11-1917 the Court of Wards considered only the benefit of the 
grantee and not that of the ward and (4) that the deed was void be-
cause no sanction had been given to it by the Court of Wards, as 
required bys. 18 of the Court of Wards Act, 1879. 
Held, (1) that the Court of Wards is not in the same position 
as a guardian of the properties of a minor. It is a statutory body 
with powers defined by the Court of Wards Act, 1879. Under s. 18 
~3 
1956 
April 10 
1956 
Karanpura 
Develo.Ptnent Co., 
Ud. 
v. 
Raja K aniakshya 
Narain Singh 
326 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1956) 
of the Act the Court of Wards is given the power to jndge for itself 
whether a transaction entered into by it on behalf of the ward Β·is 
for the benefit of the property and the advantage of the ward and 
its a.ct cannot be impugned in a court of law by the ward on attain-
ing majority unless he shows that it did not act bona fide and in the 
interests of the ward and that its action amounted to a fraud 
on the power, or that it did not, in fact, apply its mind to the 
question whether the act was for the benefit of the property or 
the advantage of the ward, and that though it purported to exer-
cise the power under s. 18, it did not, 
i~ fact, come to a judg-
ment as required by the section. Its decision cannot be ques-
tioned on the ground that it was erroneous on the merits, or 
that it was reached without considering some aspects which 
ought to have been considered, unless the failure to consider them 
was of such a character as to amount to there being no exercise 
of judgment at all; 
Allcroft v. Lord Bishop of London: Lighton v. Lord Bishop 
of London, ([189i] A.O. 666), relied on. 
(2) that assuming that the cess clause in the deed dated 
26-3-1915 was less advantageous to the ward than that in the 
Bokaro license, as the Court of Wards had applied its mind to 
the question and formed its own judgment on it, its decision is 
not open to question; 
(3) that the Court of Wards was competent to enter into the 
transaction dated 23-11-1917 and extend the period of license so 
as to enure for a period beyond the date of the ward coming of 
age, as s. 18 of the Act which confers authority on 

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.