KAPILDEO PRASAD SAH AND ORS. versus STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS.

Citation: [1999] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 725 · Decided: 25-08-1999 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S. SAGHIR AHMAD · Disposal: Disposed off

Judgment (excerpt)

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KAPILDEO PRASAD SAH AND ORS. 
A 
v. 
ST A TE OF BIHAR AND ORS. 
AUGUST 25, 1999 
[S. SAGHIR AHMED AND D.P. WADHWA, JJ.] 
B 
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 : 
·~ 
Section 2(b)-Civil Contempt-Power to punish for contempt-When 
should be exercised-Wilful disobedience of order of court alleged-Nothing C 
shown to substantiate the allegations-Held, power to punish for contempt 
should be resorted to when there is clear and wilful violation of order of the 
court-Under the facts and circumstances of the case, held, contempt 
proceedings not maintainable. 
Words and Phrases-'Wilful'-Meaning of in the context of Contempt of D 
Courts Act. 
Appellants, untrained teachers, were working as Assistant Teachers in 
,.;. 
Godda District in the State of Bihar when their services were terminated. In 
the matter of similarly placed teachers Supreme Court issued a direction E 
that State Government should fill up the existing vacancies, if any, by 
appointing untrained teachers who were eligible to be appointed and in case 
vacancies existed before January 1, 1992 the teachers so appointed would be 
entitled to salary from July 1, 1992 till their appointment. Appellants got 
similar order in their writ petition from the High Court on the basis of the 
Supreme Court Judgment. 
F 
Appellants were appointed on October 4, 1994 and claimed arrears of 
salary on the ground that it was a case of reappointment under the orders 
of the Court and that since they were appointed against vacancies existing 
prior to January 1, 1992, they were entitled to salary from July 1, 1992 till 
October 3, 1994. On receiving no response from the State Government, the G 
appellants filed contempt proceedings in the High Court against the 
respondent-State which contended that no vacancy existed in Godda District 
as on January 1, 1992 High Court dismissed the contempt proceedings and 
held that there was no violation of its order. Against the judgment of the ffjgh 
Court, t~e appellants have filed the present appeal. 
H 
I 
725 
726 
SUPREME COUR l' REPORTS (1999] SUPP. l S.C.R. 
A 
The appellants contended that the respondents were wilfully and 
ddilJU&l:ely Oooting the orders and directions of the courts. The respondents 
contended that the appellants were not entitled to arrears of salary since no 
available vacancy existed before January 1, 1992; and that the appointment 
orders of the appellants also did not show that they were appointed against 
B any vacancy that existed before January 1, 1992. 
Disposing of the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1. For holding a person to have committed contempt, civil 
contempt at that, it has to be shown that there has been wilful disobedience 
C of the judgment or order of the Court. Power to punish for contempt is to 
be resorted to when there is clear violation of the Court's order. Since notice 
of contempt and punishment for contempt have far reaching consequence, 
these powers should be invoked only when a clear case of wilful disobedience 
of the Court's order has been made out 'Wilful' would exclude casual, 
accidental, bona fide or unintentional acts or genuine inability to comply 
D with the terms of the order. Whether disobedience is wilful in a particular 
case depends on the facts and circumstances of that case. Judicial orders are 
to be properly understood and complied. Even negligence and carelessness 
can amount to disobedience particularly when attention of the person is 
drawn to the court's orders and its implication. Disobedience of court's 
E order strikes at the very root of rule of law on which our system of governance 
is based. Power to punish for contempt is necessary for the maintenance of 
effective legal system. It is exercised to prevent perversion of the course of 
justice. No person can defy court's order. Jurisdiction to punish for contempt 
exists to provide ultimate sanction against the person who refuses to comply 
with the order of the Court or disregards the order continuously. 
F 
(730-8, C, D, El 
Attorney General v. Times Newspaper Ltd, (1973) 3 All E.R. 54, referred 
G 
2. A petitioner who complains breach of court's order must allege 
deliberate or contumacious disobedience of the court's order. The appellants 
have not produced anything to show that the claim of the respondents that 
appellants have not been appointed against any vacancy existing on January 
1, 1992 is not true or that the respondents are intentionally or deliberately 
advancing the plea to deprive the appellants 

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