LexKANWAR SINGH versus DELHI ADMINISTRATION
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• A KANWAR SINGH v . DELHI ADMINISTRATION August 5, 1964 B (RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.R. MUDHOLKAR, AND S.M. SIKRI JJ.) c D E F G H Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (Act 66 of 1957), s. 418(1)- Impounding of cattle-Delegation of authority, scope of-"Ahandoned" meaning.of-Private defence under s, 99, Indian Penal Code, 1860, extent of. The members of a raiding party led by the Licensing Inspector of the Delhi Corporation having taken into custody 25 or 30 stray cattle, were, wbile taking them to the cattle pound, belaboured with lat.~is by the three appellants and their friends, as a result of which they received injuries. It was contended on behalf of the appellants that ( i) there was no proper delegation of authority to impound cattle in favour of the persons forming the raiding party, by the Commissioner, whose personal pre- senee to supervise the exercise of the delegated authority was, in any case, required by the very order delegating the authority; (ii) the cattle were not "abandoned" in the sense of being "ownerless'', and therefore could not be legally impounded; and (iii) that the injuries were infilcted by the appellants in the lawt:ul exercise of their right of .private defence of property. HELD : (i) The order of the Commissioner placed before the Court along with the statement of case proved that the Commi,..ioner had authorised licensing Inspectors to impound stray cattle. Section 418(1) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (Central Act 66 of 1957), did not require that the delegation of power must be to particular, named, individuals. Nor was the personal -- presence of the Commissioner to supervise the exercise of the delegated power necessary although accord- ing to the terms of the order the delegation was "subject to my super- vision, control and revision." [llE-F]. (ii) In the context in which the word "abandoned" occurred in section 418(!), the meaning which can reasonably be attached to it is "let loose"· in the sense of being '1eft unattended" and certainly not "ownerless". It is the duty of the Court in construing a statute tD give effect to the intention of the legislature 50 as to "advance the remedy and suppress the mischier'. The legislature when it used the word "aban- doned" in section 418(1) did not intend to say that the cattle must be "ownerless". (12E-0]. Marwel/ on Interpretation of Statut!IS (·11th Edn.) .pp. 221-224 and 266, referred to. (iii~ Section 99 of the Indian Penal Code specifically says that there- is no right of private defence against an aot which does not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if done, or attempt- ed 'lo be done by the direction of a public servant acting in good faith, under colour of his office. 'I'he pr-0tection extends even to acts which will not be stricUy justified by law. In the .present case the act was fully justifiable by the law. There was thus no -right of private defence that could be claimed by the appellants. [13B-C]. 8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1965] I S.C.R. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. A 24 of 1963. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated November 19, 1962, of the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench) at Delhi in Criminal Revision No. 337-D of 1962. R. L. Kohli, for the appellants. B H. R. Khanna and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Mudholkar J. This is an appeal by special leave from the summary dismissal of the appellants' application for revision • by the High Court of Punjab. C > Eight persons were tried by the Assistant Sessions Judge, Delhi, for offences under s. 148, s. 333/149, and s. 332/149, Indian Penal Code. He acquitted five 9f them but convicted the three appellants before us of all the three offences and sen- tenced them to undergo rigorous imprisomnent for one year in 0 respcot of the offence under s. 148, rigorous imprisonment for two years in respect of the offence under s. 332/149, rigorous imprisonment for three years for the offence under s. 333/149 and ordered that all the sentences will run concurrently. In appeal the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, set aside the con- victions and sentences passed on the appellants for offences E under s. 148 and s. 333/149, altered the conviction of each of the appellants from one under s. 332/149 to s. 322 simpliciter and awarded the same sentence in respect of it a~ had b
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