KANNAN AND ANR. versus TAMIL TALIR KALVI KAZHAGAM

Citation: [1998] 3 S.C.R. 497 · Decided: 15-05-1998 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K. VENKATASWAMI · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

·~ 
KANNAN AND ANR. 
A 
v. 
:::-
TAMIL TALIR KALVI KAZHAGAM 
MAY 15, 1998 
[K. VENKATASWAMI AND A.P. MISRA, JJ.] 
B 
Rent Control and Eviction/Pondicherry Buildings (Lease And Rent 
Control) Act, 1969-Ss. 9 (3), (4), & (5)-Two persons claiming rent-
Doubts as to whom rent is to be tendered-Rent tendered to the authority c 
as directed by the Rent Control/er-Contesting owners claiming that rent 
not having been paid, to them, there was a default-Held : Where there is 
genuine doubt as to whom the rent is to be paid, due to a dispute between 
alleged landlords which has not been settled by a competent court, there is 
no default if rent is tendered to the concerned authority under the directions 
of the Rent Controller. 
D 
~~ 
Suit-Dismissal for default-Settlement of dispute involves adjudication 
of the /is between the claimants by a competent court- Mere dismissal of suit 
for default is not settlement of the dispute since doubts continue about the 
real landlord to whom rent is to be tendered. 
Interpretation of Statutes-When more than two interpretations are E 
possible, that which subserves the object of the Act should be followed. 
The demised property which was taken on lease by the appellants 
belonged to the Respondent institution of which, at the relevant time K was 
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the president. Later he was replaced by T. Due to a dispute between the 
---..( 
F 
outgoing and incoming Presidents, both demanded rent from the appellants 
upon which, a bona fide doubt having arisen, the appellants filed a RCOP 
before the Rent Controller under section 9 (3) of the Act. Since neither K 
nor T, appeared and there were also other claimants, the Rent Controller 
permitted the appellants to deposit the rent with concerned authority. The 
respondent filed an application under Section 10 (2) (i) of the Act before the G 
Rent Controller and prayed for eviction of the appellant for wilful default, 
which was dismissed. An appeal however, was allowed on the ground that the 
: 
right procedure was not followed. High Court, in Revision, held that there 
,.,. 
was a default since at the time of the eviction petition, there was no dispute 
between the landlords and there was no justification for proceedings under 
Section 9 (3) of the Act. In appeal to this Court, it was contended by the H 
497 
/ 
498 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1998) 3 S.C.R. 
A appellants that they had filed the application because of a genuiq,e doubt and 
continued to deposit the rent regularly as per the directions of the Rent 
controller and hence there was no default. This was disputed by the respondent 
who pointed out that in 1984 the suit of K was dismissed and thereafter there 
was no dispute, yet the appellants did not tender rent to the landlord. 
B 
Allowing the appeal, this Court 
HELD : 1. The appellants-tenants had not defaulted in the payment of 
rent and they could not be held to be defaulters liable for eviction as doubt 
could not be said to have been erased. It is not in dispute that in the year 
C 1980 a dispute arose which caused the appellants to doubt as to whom rent 
was payable, hence tender of the rent to the Rent Controller in the year 1982 
was bona fide and valid. The present case is not a case of settlement between 
the parties. The simple option left with the respondent was to have approached 
the Controller (Prescribed Authority), where the matter was pending, for an 
order and on it being passed the respondent would have received back all the 
D deposited rent and thereafter would have obligated the appellants to pay the 
future rent to the landlord. In view of this, the dispute not being settled by 
any competent court, the preceding words, "until the doubt is removed"., are 
of significance. In a case of this kind, is it inferable that merely on dismissal 
of suit for default, the doubt would be said to have been removed from the 
mind of the tenant, even if he was a party to such a suit. On the contrary, 
E hope of removal of all possible doubts by decision in the suit of the contending 
rights was washed away when the suit was dismissed for default. The doubt, 
which was prior to the suit, returned back. Mere culmination of the suit in 
the present case would have no effect as to create any obligation on the tenant 
to stop rendering rent under Section 9 (3) and start paying to the landlord. 
p 
In other words, in case he continues to deposit the rent regularly with the 
Prescribed Authority it would not constitute default under the 

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