LexKANGRA VALLEY SLATE CO. LTD. versus STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS.
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- . A KANGRA VALLEY SLATE CO. LTD • v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. December 19, 1968 B [J. M. SHELAT, V. BHARGAVA AND C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.J c D E F ·G H Mines & Mineral Regulations and Concession Rules, 1960 r. 28- Application for renewt.l of lease-Li111itation for-Scope of-Fixation of tinze by r. 28, whether n1andatory, and whether ultra vires the rule niaking power. Rule 28(1) of the Mines Concession Rules, 1960 (as it stood in 1961) provided that applications for renewal of a mining lease shall be made at least six months before expiry of the lease. The appellant whose mining lease was to expire on March 22, 1962 made an application for reney.:al of the lease. The application bore the date September 20, 1961 and was received by the Director of Industries on October 9, 1961. On the questions (i) whether r. 28 prescribed any time limit within wliich an application had to be made; (ii) even if it did, whethe'r it was only direc- tory and not mandatory; and (iii) whether r .. 28 laying down the period of limitation for renewal of application was ultra vires s. 13(2) of the Mines & Minerals (Regwlations & Development) Act, 1957 as the time limit prescribed in the rule did not fall under any of the matters set out in the sub~section. HELD : Rule 2d was valid, and was mandatory and the application was clearly beyond the time appointed under the rule. [173 CJ (i) The statement that the application was made on September 20, 1961 was verified by the·, Secretary of the appellant company, as true- to the best of his knowledge and belief. The Secretary ought to have personal knowledge whether the application was made on the alleged date or not. The Government did not admit that the application was sent on Septem~ er 20, 1961 and the company in the re.ioinder repeated that it \Vas sent on that date. In spite of the date of sending the application being put in issue, no attempt was made by tht appellant to show from its despatch book or any other record or otherwise that it was actually despatched on the date alleged. No argument even was advanced in the High Court that as it was made on September 20, 1961 it was within time. The mere fact, therefore, that the application bore the date could not mean that it was made: on that date and was therefore within time. [I 70 B·C] (ii) Considering the scheme and the object of the Act and. the rules it could riot be held that r. 28 was not intended to be mandatory and was only directory. The rules laying down time limits for making applications, acknowledging their receipts and disposal thereof were intended to sec that the development of mines and exploitation of mine· rals took place both in a regulated manner and without any undue delay. If the time limit of six months prescribed in rules 22 and 28 was not available to the State Government it would not be possible for it to decide within time and to, follow the procedure for granting a fresh lease to someone else. The result would be that mining _operations would be delayed in that particular land and to that extent the object of the Act and the duty imposed by s. 18 on the Central Government would be delayed or defeated. [172 B-D] 166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1969] 3 S.C.R. (iii) Rule 28 was not invalid by renson of its not falling under any one of the matters set out ills. 13(2) of the Act. Assuming that the time limit prescribed in the rule did not fall under any of the matters set out in that sub-section, Sub-.sec. l authorises the Central Government to make for regulating the grant of mining leases and the Cent'ral Govern- ment in pursuance of that power can make rules including the one laying down the time within which a renewal application should be made. A grant of renewal of a lease is granting a mining lease, and therefore, fixing time within which an application for it should be made would be regulating the grant of a lease. The function of sub-sec. 2 was merely an illustrative one considering that the rule making power was conferred by sub-sec. 1 and the rules referred to in the opening ·sentence of sub-sec. 2 were the rules \\1hich were authorised by and made under sub"'6ec. 1. Therefore, the provisions of sub-sec. 2 were not restrictive of sub--sec. 1 and that indeed was expiessly stated by the words "without prejudice to the generality of the power conferred by sub-sec. !". [172 E-Hl King-E1nperor v. Sihnath Banerjee, 72 I.A. 24
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